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INTRODUCTION
The past three or four decades have witnessed a fundamental change in
attitudes within the federal judiciary regarding the proper function and role of
the United States Supreme Court in the judicial hierarchy. Increasingly,
instead of being first among equals, part of a joint enterprise, the Court sees
itself, and is seen, as different in kind from other courts. Concomitantly, the
judges of the lower, or "inferior,"1 federal courts are viewed by the Court, and
even view themselves, as subordinates who must defer to "judicial superiors."
'2
If Akhil Amar was correct to argue in favor of the "structural parity of all
Article III judicial officers," 3 it would seem that the members of the federal
judiciary are not aware of this fact.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the causes of these developments,
Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law
<bhagwata@uchastings.edu>. B.A. 1986 Yale University; J.D. 1990 The University of
Chicago. I would like to thank Bill Dodge, Michael Dorf, David Faigman, Adam Hirsch,
Evan Lee, Richard Posner, and Reuel Schiller for extremely helpful comments and
suggestions.
See U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1.
2 Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1364 (7th Cir.1996), rev'd, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
3 Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 221 (1985).
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and through this process to develop insights regarding the nature and structure
of the federal judiciary as it exists today. My ultimate thesis is that over the
past half century the Supreme Court has evolved into an institution different in
kind from all other federal courts, functioning as a rule maker and legislature
for other courts rather than a resolver of disputes, to the point where the Court
can barely be said to be exercising the "judicial power" as traditionally
understood. Unfortunately, however, for reasons both institutional and
structural, the Court is not particularly good at this role. Furthermore, the
evolution of the Court into a quasi-legislature, while in some respects
unavoidable, has had unfortunate consequences for the federal judiciary as a
whole.
Part I of this paper examines one doctrinal area where the tension and
changing relationships between the Supreme Court and lower courts has
exhibited itself-the question of lower courts' authority to "underrule" or
refuse to follow outdated or undermined Supreme Court precedents. Part II
considers the changing roles within the federal judicial system of the Supreme
Court and inferior federal courts, and examines the institutional forces which
have driven the evolution in the Supreme Court's functions. Finally, Part III
discusses some of the normative implications of the developments identified in
this paper.
I. THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE: OVERRULING OUTMODED SUPREME
COURT PRECEDENTS
Barkat Khan, the owner/operator of a gas station in Du Page County,
Illinois, brought a federal antitrust action against State Oil Company, his
gasoline supplier, on the peculiar theory that State Oil had violated the antitrust
laws by effectively preventing Khan from raising the prices he charged
consumers for his gasoline.4 Khan' s theory of liability seems to run contrary to
economic common sense and to one of the basic purposes of the antitrust
law-to protect consumers from higher prices;5 and the district court judge
before whom the case was brought granted summary judgment to State Oil on
essentially those grounds. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit reversed, relying on Albrecht v. Herald Company,6 a 1968
decision of the United States Supreme Court holding that so-called "vertical
maximum price fixing" constituted a per se violation of the antitrust laws.7
The Appeals Court's opinion by Chief Judge Richard A. Posner8 extensively
4 See State Oil. Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 8 (1997).
See id. at 15 ("[W]e find it difficult to maintain that vertically imposed maximum
prices could harm consumers or competition to the extent necessary to justify their per se
invalidation.").
6 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
7 See id. at 153 ("[To force petitioner to maintain a specified price... constituted,
without more, an illegal restraint of trade under § 1 of the Sherman Act.").
8 93 F.3d at 1359. It should be remembered that Judge Posner was the leader of the
[Vol. 80:967
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criticized the economic logic of Khan's claim, as well as the per se rule of
Albrecht, noting that not only was Albrecht's holding almost certainly wrong
as a matter of economic theory, but it was also inconsistent with the language
and reasoning of recent, more economically oriented Supreme Court antitrust
opinions.9 Nonetheless, the opinion noted that:
despite all its infirmities, its increasingly wobbly, moth-eaten
foundations.. ., Albrecht has not been expressly overruled .... And the
Supreme Court has told the lower federal courts, in increasingly
emphatic, even strident, terms, not to anticipate an overruling of a
decision by the Court; we are to leave the overruling to the Court itself." 10
Therefore, Judge Posner concluded that he was obliged to yield to his "judicial
superiors"1 Iand reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment.
State Oil sought review of Judge Posner's decision in the Supreme Court,
and the Court granted certiorari.' 2 Oral argument was heard in October of
1997, and less than one month after oral argument, in the first substantive
opinion of that Term the Supreme Court unanimously overruled its Albrecht
decision and reversed the Seventh Circuit.13 Along the way the Court quoted
extensively from Judge Posner's opinion criticizing the economic logic of
Albrecht,14 as well as from a broad range of scholarly criticism. Given all of
this, including notably the fact that he was reversed by the Court, one might
have thought that Judge Posner should have ruled for State Oil in the first
instance. However, the Supreme Court informs us: "The Court of Appeals was
correct in applying that principle despite disagreement with Albrecht, for it is
this Court's prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents."' 15 No reason
was given beyond this bald statement for why "[t]he Court of Appeals was
correct," and why burying dead precedent was the Court's own "prerogative;"
but the validity of this approach was not questioned by any member of the
Court. Thus, it was that Judge Posner was vindicated by being unanimously
reversed by the Supreme Court.
The Khan litigation represents a relatively extreme version of an
Chicago School and a pioneer in the application of neoclassical economics to antitrust
analysis. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
(1976); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
925 (1979).
9 93 F.3d at 1361-63 (reciting possible explanations for and repercussions of maximum
price fixing, and reviewing Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Albrecht).
l0 id. at 1363.
11 Id. at 1364.
12 See State Oil Co., v. Khan, 519 U.S. 1107 (1997).
11 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (establishing that virtual maximum price
fixing is not a per se violation of the Sherman Act).
14 See id. at 15-16 (quoting Judge Posner for the proposition that suppliers legitimately
may desire maximum resale prices).
15 Id. at 20.
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increasingly common phenomenon: the Supreme Court's insistence that lower
courts must apply and follow an extant, on-point precedent of the Court no
matter how outdated that precedent, and no matter how much later decisions
may have undermined the reasoning of that precedent. This rule, at least in its
modem, implacable form, is of relatively recent vintage. 16 Though in various
opinions the Court has hinted at such a principle for many years, 17 it was only
in 1989 in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.18 that the
Court unequivocally stated: "If a precedent of this Court has direct application
in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of
decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls,
leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions."'19
Rodriguez de Quijas also involved application of a moribund and seemingly
undermined Supreme Court precedent, but in that case, unlike Khan, the Court
of Appeals chose to treat the precedent as not binding. For this impudence, the
Supreme Court scolded the lower court (despite the majority's agreement with
and affirmance of the Appeals Court on the merits of the case), with the dissent
in the Court accusing the Court of Appeals of "engag[ing] in an indefensible
brand of judicial activism." 20 As in Khan, however, the Court offered no
justification for its adoption of this rule.
Since Rodriguez de Quijas, as Judge Posner notes, the Supreme Court has
become "increasingly emphatic, even strident" 21 in its insistence that lower
courts follow all extant Supreme Court precedent until and unless it has been
expressly overruled. Another recent, prominent example of this trend is
Agostini v. Felton, a case which because of its unusual procedural posture
presented a particularly striking application of the Court's approach. 22 In this
16 For two early examples of cases where lower courts did "underrule" Supreme Court
decisions without any negative comment by the Court on review, see Barnette v. West
Virginia Sch. Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251, 253 (S.D. W. Va. 1942), aff'd 319 U.S. 624
(1943); Committee for Industrial Organization v. Hague, 25 F. Supp. 127, 150-51 (D.N.J.
1938), aff'd 101 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1939), aff'd 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
17 See, e.g., Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535
(1983) (per curiam) ("Needless to say, only this Court may overrule one of its precedents.");
Jaffree v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs of Mobile County, 459 U.S. 1314, 1315-16 (1983)
(Powell, J., in chambers) (granting a stay of judgment because the District Court did not
follow controlling Supreme Court cases).
18 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
'9 Id. at 484. For a detailed history of the evolution of the Rodriguez de Quijas rule, see
C. Steven Bradford, Following Dead Precedent: The Supreme Court's Ill-Advised Rejection
of Anticipatory Overruling, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. 39, 43-52 (1990) (reviewing lower courts'
decisions on anticipatory overruling and arguing the Rodriquez de Quijas rejection was
surprising).
20 Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 486 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1 Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1363 (7th Cir. 1996).
22 521 U.S. 203 (1997). Agostini represented a significant change in the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, permitting greater state aid to religiously affiliated
(Vol. 80:967
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paper, I do not mean to debate the merits and demerits of this approach in
detail. Other scholars have discussed the evolution of the rule of Rodriguez de
Quijas, and have ably (as well as almost unanimously) critiqued it.23 Instead, I
wish to look at this rule in a broader context, to seek out its institutional roots
and purposes, and through this to try and cast light on the broader question of
the role of the Supreme Court in the federal judiciary.
To understand the institutional bases for the Rodriguez de Quijas doctrine,
however, one must first understand its contours and scope. There are three
distinct ways in which a lower court might "underrule," or refuse to follow a
Supreme Court precedent. First, and most controversially, a lower court judge
might choose to ignore a Supreme Court opinion that the Court itself has not
questioned or undermined, simply because of the judge's view that the
precedent was mistaken-perhaps the best known example being Judge
Brevard Hand of the Southern District of Alabama refusing to apply the
Court's school prayer decisions.24 However, almost all commentators, 25 with
schools. The case was also procedurally interesting, however, because the Court reached its
result by permitting a litigant to bring a motion for relief from the judgment pursuant to
Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and through that process overruling a
previous decision of the Court, Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), in which the same
litigant had been defeated, on the grounds that later decisions of the Court had undermined
the reasoning of the earlier decision. As the Court acknowledged, however, under
Rodriguez de Quijas the lower courts hearing the Rule 60(b)(5) motion were not permitted
to ignore Aguilar and grant the motion, even though the Court itself ultimately concluded
that not only should Aguilar be overruled, but that later cases had "so undermined Aguilar
that it [was] no longer good law." 521 U.S. at 217-18, 237. The Court never resolved the
obvious tension between these positions, suggesting an infirmity in the Court's approach
towards its own precedent. For a thorough discussion of the Court's decision in Agostini,
including the application of the rule of Rodriguez de Quijas in that case, see Hugh Baxter,
Managing Legal Change: The Transformation of Establishment Clause Law, 46 UCLA L.
REv. 343,438-57 (1998).
23 See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 22, at 443-57; Bradford, supra note 19, at 42 (criticizing
the Supreme Court decision in Rodriguez de Quijas); Margaret N. Kniffin, Overruling
Supreme Court Precedents: Anticipatory Action by United States Courts of Appeals, 51
FORDHAM L. REv. 53, 55-56 (1982) (evaluating the validity of anticipatory overruling);
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the Themes of Robert M.
Cover's Justice Accused, 7 J. L. & RELIGION 33, 82-87 (1989) (reviewing the arguments that
a lower court may "underrule" the Supreme Court); David C. Bratz, Comment, Stare
Decisis in Lower Courts: Predicting the Demise of Supreme Court Precedent, 60 WASH. L.
REv. 87 (1984) (arguing in favor of lower court authority to disregard precedent in certain
circumstances); cf Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking
Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1, 70-72 (1994) (finding a
prohibition against anticipatory overruling justifiable).
24 See Jaffree v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs of Mobile County, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1128
(S.D. Ala. 1983), affd in part and rev'd sub nom. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied 446 U.S. 926 (1984), aff'd 472 U.S. 38 (1985). For a discussion of
judicial attempts to circumvent the doctrine of hierarchical precedent, see Evan H.
200]
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the notable exception of Michael Stokes Paulsen,26 reject such a power for the
lower courts, and the few decisions are (not surprisingly) in accord. 27
Second, a lower court might engage in purely predictive reasoning and
refuse to follow a precedent that the court believes the Supreme Court would
not follow today based on the court's assessment of the views of individual
justices, even if the decision has not been undermined by what Michael Doff
describes as "impersonal sources of law"-i.e., subsequent opinions. 28 Such
an approach is defensible, and indeed has been ably advocated by Evan
Caminker;29 but Michael Dorf has presented a convincing, if not definitive
argument for why such purely predictive reasoning undermines values
associated with the rule of law.30 It is therefore also not surprising or
problematic that the Supreme Court should reject such purely predictive
"underruling." 31
The third form of "underruling" is much more limited and seemingly
uncontroversial: the power of lower court judges to conclude that a Supreme
Court precedent has been undermined by later decisions to the point that it has
been implicitly overruled by the Court itself, and is therefore no longer
binding. Such reasoning is not truly predictive because it analyzes and seeks
to reconcile binding legal authority, rather than ignoring it-the question is
simply which authority is more binding, the older, more "on point" precedent
or the newer inconsistent decisions. 32 The propriety of this kind of action was
Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents, 46 STAN. L. REV.
817, 819 & n.4 (1994).
25 See generally Caminker, supra note 24 at 860-65.
26 See Paulsen, supra note 23, at 82-85.
27 See, e.g., Jaffree v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs of Mobile County, 459 U.S. 1314, 1316
(1983) (Powell, Circuit Justice).
28 Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REv. 651, 654 (1995).
For an example of such decision-making, see Barnette v. West Virginia Sch. Bd. of Educ.,
47 F. Supp. 251, 253 (S.D. W. Va. 1942), aff'd 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (refusing to follow a
Supreme Court decision because the foundations of that decision had been weakened).
29 See Caminker, supra note 23, at 74 ("In the end, I believe that prediction has a proper,
albeit circumscribed, role to play in inferior court decision-making."); see also Bratz, supra
note 23 at 89 (discussing the "limited circumstances" where a lower court can disregard
Supreme Court precedent).
30 Dorf, supra note 28 at 679-89 (arguing that predictive reasoning can undermine the
rule of law because it makes law appear dependent on judge's personalities, rather than on
objective, impersonal factors).
31 It should be noted, though, that rejecting even predictive underruling imposes serious
efficiency costs on litigants and the judicial system, as well as limiting the role of the lower
courts in initiating and implementing legal change.
32 See Caminker, supra note 23 at 20 n.73 (analyzing the behavior of courts when faced
with the dilemma of newer binding precedent conflicting with older on-point precedent);
Dorf, supra note 28 at 676-77 n.87 (disagreeing with the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Rodriguez de Quijas).
[Vol. 80:967
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at issue in Rodriguez de Quijas, Agostini, and State Oil v. Khan; and in those
cases the Supreme Court definitively rejected any such power on the part of the
lower courts. The net result of the Court's approach, therefore, is that in
deciding if it is bound by a precedent of the Court, lower courts must ignore
the reasoning of that decision and subsequent doctrinal developments which
might bring the validity of that reasoning into question, focusing instead on the
narrow holding of the case, and whether it has been expressly overruled.
Described as such, it is clear that the rule of Rodriguez de Quijas raises
important questions of institutional legitimacy for the Court. What does it
mean for a court of law to announce that the reasons it gives for its decisions
do not matter; all that matters is the decision itself, the raw exercise of power?
After all, one can argue that deciding in a reasoned manner and explaining the
reasons for one's decision is the essence of judging, as distinguished from
other forms of state power.33 As Michael Doff has put it, "[flor the judiciary,
giving reasons justifies the exercise of governmental authority, much as
elections justify its exercise by the political branches. '34 Of course, courts do
sometimes decide cases without explaining their reasoning, as with summary
affirmances and other decisions without opinion, but it is presumably because
the reasons for the decisions are so obvious as not to require belaboring. If that
is not the case, if an unexplained decision is not obviously correct, such
behavior also raises grave questions of judicial legitimacy. 35 When a court (or
at least an Article III federal court) behaves in a way which suggests that what
really matters is not the reasons for its actions but rather the simple fact of its
authority, it is no longer behaving as a court should-it is no longer exercising
the "judicial power of the United States" 36 as properly understood. Instead, at
this point the Court is acting more as a legislature, in which the act of adopting
a rule, the sheer exercise of power, provides a complete justification for the
33 See Doff, supra note 28 at 686 (arguing that the custom of giving reasons justifies the
exercise of judicial power); David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L.
REv. 731, 737 (1987) ("[R]easoned response to reasoned argument is an essential aspect of
the judicial process."); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,
73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 15 (1959) ("I put it to you that the main constituent of the judicial
process is precisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step
that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the
immediate result that is achieved."); cf Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L.
REv. 633 (1995) (exploring the potential drawbacks to giving reasons for legal decisions
under all circumstances).
34 Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article II, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1997, 2029 (1994).
35 My argument does not apply to judicial actions, such as denials of certiorari by the
Supreme Court, which are truly discretionary with the court and do not involve the
substantive resolution of legal rights. Such actions do not constitute an exercise of state
power in the same way as resolution of a case on the merits, and the issuing of a mandate or
other judicial order.
36 U.S. CONST., art. III, §1.
2000]
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action and for the binding obligation it imposes on citizens. 37 Judges should
give reasons for their decisions, but legislators clearly need not. In Rodriguez
de Quijas the Supreme Court comes perilously close to suggesting that, like
legislatures, it need not give reasons, or at least reasons that have any
significance or limiting effect.3 8
The rule of Rodriguez de Quijas thus stretches the Supreme Court's
institutional legitimacy to its limit. This stretching raises a secondary,
institutional objection to the rule: the circularity of a decision of the Supreme
Court defining the binding power of its own precedents. 39 The "doctrine" of
Rodriguez de Quijas is quite different from, for example, the First-Amendment
doctrine established by New York Times v. Sullivan.40 The latter deals with the
substantive rights and obligations of private citizens and other state actors,
while the former deals with the powers and obligations of the Court itself. To
concede that the Court's substantive decisions are binding on lower courts, and
perhaps on all government officials, 41 does not necessitate a conclusion that
decisions like Rodriquez de Quijas are binding on anyone. Indeed, there are
obvious reasons why the Court should not be the final word on the scope of its
own authority.42 The conflict of interest is obvious-foxes should not guard
henhouses. And, like other federal government entities, the authority of the
Supreme Court is constrained by the Constitution, and does not extend beyond
3 I develop this argument regarding the quasi-legislative nature of the Court's current
role further in Part III.A, infra.
38 For a similar argument, see Michael C. Dorf, Courts, Reasons, and Rules in RULES
AND REASONING: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF FRED SCHAUER 129, 135-37 (Linda Meyer ed. 1999)
(discussing why courts need to explain their decisions); Doff, supra note 34, at 2067 (same);
contrast RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 82 (1990) ("Judicial
decisions are authoritative because they emanate from a politically accredited source rather
than because they are agreed to be correct."); Sanford Levinson, On Positivism and Potted
Plants: "Inferior" Judges and the Task of Constitutional Interpretation, 25 CONN. L. REV.
843, 849 (1993) (arguing that the "political pedigree" is the source of the Court's authority).
39 See Paulsen, supra note 23 at 83 n.132 (commenting on the "circularity" of the
argument that Supreme Court cases are binding because the Supreme Court cases say they
are).
40 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (limiting a State's ability to award damages in libel suits
brought by public officials to those instances where actual malice was intended).
1 See Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1360-61 (1997) (describing, but rejecting,
arguments supporting "judicial non-exclusivity" in constitutional interpretation); see also
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (holding that Congress, in exercising its
powers to enforce the Civil War Amendments, must accept and legislate on the basis of the
Court's interpretations regarding the substantive scope of those Amendments).
42 Of course, in practice the Court has claimed precisely such power, through judicially-
created doctrines such as standing and the political question doctrine. The question is how
other institutional actors should treat such claims.
[Vol. 80:967
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the power delegated to it in Article 111. 43 Thus, when the Court seeks to define
its power beyond the constitutional limits, there is a powerful argument that
others, including perhaps lower federal courts, should consider its actions
ineffective, 44 just as a congressional statute or an executive order declaring an
otherwise unconstitutional action to be consistent with the Constitution would
be ineffective.
Beyond the institutional weaknesses of the rule of Rodriguez de Quijas,
there are practical reasons to question the Court's fervent attachment to its own
precedents. There is an inefficiency, as State Oil v. Khan illustrates, in
requiring litigants to go all the way to the Supreme Court to overturn a
precedent which is widely acknowledged to be moribund; 45 and in this era of
weak stare decisis and constantly revised doctrine,46 the incidence of specific
precedents which are no longer consistent with the Court's current views and
recent decisions has expanded dramatically. Furthermore, one consequence of
the rule of Rodriguez de Quijas is that when the Court adopts a new approach
in an area of law, especially constitutional law, it takes much longer for that
approach to be fully adopted and implemented by the rest of the judiciary. The
lower courts remain obliged to follow extant, narrow, and older precedents that
are directly on point, even if their reasoning and result is clearly inconsistent
with the Court's recent decisions.47 Finally, if taken literally (as the Court
13 The Court has recognized this point, for example, in its "standing" cases. See Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (limiting federal court power to Article III specifications).
I I say "perhaps" because the relationship of the lower federal courts to the Supreme
Court is obviously different from Congress's and the Executive Branch's relationship to the
Court. This point is explored further in Part II, infra.
45 It is notable that in his opinion in Khan v. State Oil Company, Judge Posner
specifically predicted the demise of Albrecht. Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1363
(7th Cir. 1996)("[Albrecht] should be overruled. Someday, we expect, it will be.").
46 See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 209 (1997) (overruling Aguilar v. Felton,
473 U.S. 402 (1985)); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996) (overruling
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990));
United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993) (overruling Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508
(1990)); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 822 (1991) (overruling Booth v. Maryland, 482
U.S. 496 (1987)); but cf. Thomas Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the
Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REv. 647, 733-34 (1999) (arguing that
stare decisis has not weakened substantially in the Rehnquist Court).
47 For example, research suggests that an important and perverse consequence of the
Court's approach is that despite the Court's recent decision in Agostini, see supra note 22,
lower courts have continued to apply older, more squarely on point precedents to strike
down government aid to religious schools. See, e.g., Helms v. Picard, 151 F.3d 347, 360
(5th Cir. 1998), cert. granted 119 S. Ct. 2336 (1999) (deciding that Agostini had not
overruled prior precedent on a particular issue); Columbia Union College v. Clarke, 159
F.3d 151, 161 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that Agostini does not upset the supposition that
when religion permeates a secular college, the government cannot provide grants for secular
subjects).
2000]
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seems to indicate it should be), the rule of Rodriguez de Quijas can lead to
extreme and absurd results. If the military chose to place an ethnic minority
into concentration camps during a time of war, would the lower courts have to
uphold the action? Presumably so, because Korematsu v. United States48 has
never been expressly overruled. 49 In the wake of Brown v. Board of
Education,50 were the lower federal courts obliged to uphold all segregated
public facilities with respect to which the Court had previously upheld
segregation other than the schools? Presumably so (though thankfully for this
country, the Court of that era did not see it that way). 5' And, on a more
mundane but perhaps more practically significant level, are the host of
undermined-but-not-expressly-overruled antitrust decisions issued by the
Warren Court, such as United States v. Von's Grocery Co.52 and Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States,53 still binding on the lower courts? Again, presumably
So.
5 4
Given these numerous objections to the Court's approach, it is unclear why
the Court insists on delivering the coup-de-grace to its own precedents. One
possible explanation for the Rodriguez de Quijas rule is that it permits the
Court to better control its own timing and agenda; a lower court "overruling" a
precedent of the Supreme Court would tend to force the Court's hand in terms
of taking and resolving the issue, to maintain inter-circuit uniformity. 55
However, Rodriguez de Quijas is relevant only with respect to Supreme Court
precedents whose reasoning has been seriously undermined by other, later
Supreme Court decisions. Thus, to a significant extent, the Court does retain
control over its agenda, since the Court has created the circumstances that
might justify a lower court declaring a precedent implicitly overruled.
48 323 U.S, 214, 219 (1944) (upholding Japanese internment during World War II).
49 But cf Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
(vacating the conviction of Fred Korematsu).
50 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
51 See Baxter, supra note 22, at 451-57 (explaining the role lower courts played in
implementing the Supreme Court's decision in Brown); Bradford, supra note 19, at 71-72
(same). For an attempt by a lower court to reconcile these contradictions, see Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 697-98 & n.13 (3rd Cir. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (concluding that when the Court has abandoned a particular
legal standard, all cases decided under that standard are no longer binding).
52 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
53 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
54 As noted in Part II, infra, it seems likely that the lower courts will rebel against such
results. But not always. For a particularly absurd application of the Rodriguez de Quijas
rule, see Florida League of Professional Lobbyists v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 462 (1 1th Cir.
1996) (upholding restrictive state regulation of legislative lobbying against First
Amendment attack based on two Supreme Court precedents from 1906 and 1864, despite
massive interim developments in First Amendment law).
55 For a discussion of the value of uniformity, and the Court's role in maintaining it, see
infra notes 176-177 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, in some ways the Rodriguez de Quijas approach reduces the
Court's control over its (or more accurately, the judiciary's) agenda, because
one consequence of the rule is to delay the implementation of new approaches
adopted by the Court.
Further explanation for the Court's approach towards undermined
precedents seems necessary, and the only one that comes to mind is distrust of
the lower courts-and in particular, distrust of the lower federal courts since
they are most likely to be in the position to "underrule" the Court's decisions.
The Court seems willing to tolerate the inefficiency, delay, and occasional
injustice generated by its approach because it does not wish to grant lower
courts the authority to decide when a precedent of the Court has been so
undermined as to be no longer binding. In light of the above criticisms, other
justifications for the rule, such as minimizing conflict, or maintaining an
orderly system of justice, vanish. A strict application of the doctrine of
Rodriguez de Quijas seems more likely to breed confusion and conflict (albeit
internal conflict within the judiciary as a whole, rather than inter-circuit
conflict) than to reduce it. Therefore, whether justified as a form of respect or
as a necessary consequence of stare decisis principles, the doctrine of
Rodriguez de Quijas ultimately must be understood as a mode of control, of
exercising power over the other courts in the federal judicial hierarchy. When
the Court insists on retaining its "prerogative ... to overrule one of its
precedents" 56-- note the royal connotations 57-it is attempting to exercise a
strict form of supervision over lower courts, thereby denying them a
substantial area of discretion. 58
II. HIERARCHY AND HUBRIS
In cases like Rodriguez de Quijas, Agostini, and State Oil v. Kahn, the Court
indicates an unwillingness to share its power to make new law, which is an
aspect of the judicial power, with other courts within the federal judiciary.
Instead, the Court is seeking to concentrate the authority to make and change
the law into its own hands. 59 This is not surprising; it is after all a basic
assumption of our Constitution, as noted by Madison in Federalist No. 5 1, that
56 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997).
57 The Oxford English Dictionary reports as its first definition of the word prerogative
"[t]hat special preeminence which the sovereign, by right of regal dignity, has over all other
persons ..... " OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2283 (2d ed. 1989).
11 On the relationship between supervision and discretion, see Edward Rubin, Discretion
and Its Discontents, 72 CHI.-KENTL. REv. 1299, 1304-07 (1997).
19 Of course in principle, even without a rule such as the Rodriguez de Quijas doctrine
the highest court in a system always retains ultimate "control" over the law, through the
power of review. In practice, however, the enormous volume of federal litigation, and the
limited size of the Court's docket, makes rule-based approaches such as Rodriguez de
Quijas the only effective way to maintain that control.
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government officials will seek to expand their own power.60 The accumulation
of power in the hands of the Court, at the expense of the lower federal
judiciary, is also not a new phenomenon. Edward Purcell recently explained
that, as early as 1928, Felix Frankfurter predicted, described, and extolled this
development, in part because of Frankfurter's explicit hostility (common
among progressives at that time) to the lower federal judiciary.6' In recent
years, however, this process appears to have escalated and changed in nature.
Instead of viewing the exercise of the judicial power as a cooperative venture
in reasoned decision-making and precedent-building, where there is value to be
gained from participation by all levels of the judiciary, the Court increasingly
seems to see it as an exercise of raw power, so that any sharing of that power is
necessarily at the expense of the Court's own authority.
62
Whatever its causes, evidence of such a change in the Court's attitude
abounds. In addition to the "underruling" rule of Rodriguez de Quijas, there
are the recent, highly publicized disputes between the Supreme Court and the
Ninth Circuit over implementation of the death penalty. On two separate
occasions in recent years the Court has chastised the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals for obstructing state efforts to carry out a death sentence.63 In the first
incident, involving the execution of Robert Alton Harris in 1992, the Court
took the extraordinary step of issuing an order to the Ninth Circuit stating that
"[n]o further stays of Robert Alton Harris' execution shall be entered by the
federal courts except upon order of this Court." 64 In the second case, involving
Thomas Thompson, the Court severely criticized the Ninth Circuit's unusual
procedural actions, accusing the lower court of negligence, coming close to
60 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321-22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).
Insofar as Judges were thought not to raise the same concerns regarding overreaching as
other officials, it is not because they would lack the desire to expand their power, but
because they would lack the ability. See THE FEDERALIST No.78, at 465-66 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) (describing the judiciary as "the weakest of the three
departments of power").
61 Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Reconsidering the Frankfurtian Paradigm: Reflections on
Histories of the Lower Federal Courts, 24 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 679, 702, 705-06 (1999)
(citing FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1928) for the proposition that the lower courts'
jurisdiction should be reduced).
62 Why this shift in attitudes has occurred it is hard to say-perhaps it is an inevitable
aspect of our postmodern world, where faith in the force or even the possibility of reasoned
analysis has been undermined. For some support for this proposition, see William H.
Rehnquist, The Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 11 (1986)
(arguing that the job of the Court is not to find a "correct" solution, but only a "definitive"
one).
63 See Vasquez v. Harris, 503 U.S. 1000 (1992) (vacating the 9th Circuit's stay of
execution); Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998) (admonishing the 9th Circuit for
stalling the inevitable execution of the defendant).
64 Vasquez v. Harris, 503 U.S. 1000 (1992).
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accusing it of bad faith, and concluding that the Ninth Circuit had committed a
grave abuse of discretion. 65 The dispute between the Supreme Court and the
Ninth Circuit might simply be attributed to politics; but that is not a complete
explanation. In recent years, the Court has made it a priority to severely limit
judicial, especially federal judicial, interference in the death penalty process,
and thereby to speed up the execution process in this country. The Court's
substantive Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, as well as its decisions limiting
federal habeas corpus relief, reflect this policy.66 In Harris and Thompson the
Ninth Circuit demonstrated a willingness to ignore the Court's policy
preferences. This was unacceptable to the Court, and in response in Harris, it
took the extreme, and arguably illegitimate, step of stripping the Ninth Circuit
of the judicial power conferred on it by Congress.
The concept of "percolation" provides another example of the Court's
changing attitudes towards the rest of the judiciary. It has long been a
predicate of Supreme Court decision-making that before the Court grants
certiorari to finally resolve an issue, it will often choose to allow the issue to
"percolate" in the courts of appeals, so that the Court has the benefit of
multiple perspectives. 67 In recent years, however, no less a figure than Chief
Justice Rehnquist has questioned the value of percolation, 68 and a number of
academic commentators have agreed, suggesting implicitly (or explicitly) that
the lower courts have little to contribute to the Supreme Court's decision-
making. 69 Furthermore, Evan Caminker has made the argument, with which I
agree, that Supreme Court Justices rarely even read lower court opinions
anymore (if they ever did), thereby reducing the value of any percolation.
70
65 See Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 552 (1998). For a discussion (and defense)
of the Ninth Circuit's actions in the Thompson proceedings, see Stephen Reinhardt, The
Anatomy of an Execution: Fairness vs. "Process," 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 313, 351-53 (1999).
66 For a discussion of the recent habeas jurisprudence, see Reinhardt, supra note 65 at
315-19 (describing the Rehnquist Court's "assaults" on the writ of habeas corpus).
67 See Caminker, supra note 23, at 1, 56 n. 196 (1994) (citing authorities); Michael C.
Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 65-67 (1998)
(explaining the benefits of temporary disagreement between courts).
68 See Rehnquist, supra note 62, at 11 (suggesting that those who find benefits in
percolation are making a "virtue of necessity").
69 See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, What is Wrong with the Supreme Court?, 51 U. PIr. L. REV.
673, 691 (1990) (arguing that the benefits of percolation are exaggerated while the costs are
ignored); Caminker, supra note 23 at 56 (suggesting that independent judgments of lower
courts will not necessarily bring forth new ideas); Walter V. Schaefer, Reliance on the Law
of the Circuit-A Requiem, 1985 DUKE L.J. 690, 690 & n.2 (finding that percolation gives a
false justification for deferring decisions on difficult issues).
70 Caminker, supra note 23 at 58-59 ("Justices frequently do not avail themselves of any
potential inferior court contributions."). For an early and eminent exposition of this view,
see Henry J. Friendly, The "Law of the Circuit" and All That-Foreword to the Second
Circuit, 1970 Term, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 406, 407 (1971) ("I doubt whether many of the
Justices even read our opinions, at least on constitutional issues .... "). Of course, the
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And even after the Court has resolved a problem, and adopted a doctrinal rule,
the Justices also seem to completely lack the institutional capacity to observe
the actual operation of various doctrinal formulations in the lower courts, and
so to make practical assessments of their "workability and desirability."
71
There are many complex reasons for these developments, including growing
caseloads in the lower courts, which limit the Court's ability to keep track of
lower court decisions, and the explosion in the filing of amicus briefs that
makes lower court opinions a less important source of data and legal
arguments. 72 The results are nevertheless clear-a growing isolation of the
Supreme Court from the rest of the judiciary.
Until now, this article has focused on the view from above: the Supreme
Court's attitudes towards the lower courts. But what about the judges of those
"inferior" courts? How do they feel about the gradual loss of power and status
vis a vis the Supreme Court? The answer is mixed. One can find some
evidence of frustration and even resentment among prominent lower court
judges. Not surprisingly, the strongest reactions have been from the Ninth
Circuit. Judge Stephen Reinhardt-who admittedly is far from representative
of the federal judiciary-has written two articles which are harshly critical of
the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence, and its handling of the death penalty
disputes with the Ninth Circuit.73  He has argued that the Court acted
improperly, even vindictively, and exceeded its authority.74 The tone of both
articles is angry, bitter and derisive. 75 Another prominent federal appellate
judge, Patricia Wald of the District of Columbia Circuit, has written a more
temperate but no less pointed criticism of the Supreme Court, focusing on the
modem Court's tendency to ignore lower court opinions and denigrate the
Justices' failure to read lower court opinions does not completely eliminate the value of
percolation, since ideas developed in the lower courts can reach the Court via briefs written
by lawyers who have read those opinions. But it seems likely that a Court which looked to
lower courts for help and guidance would be more influenced by the ideas expounded by
disinterested fellow judges, than by those ideas as filtered through the briefs of partisan
lawyers.
71 Caminker, supra note 23, at 58-59.
72 See Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the
Supreme Court, 148 U. PENN. L. REv. 743, 751 (2000) (documenting the rise in amicus
brief filings in recent years).
" See Reinhardt, supra note 65, at 316 (1999) (criticizing the Supreme Court for
reducing access to federal courts and "placing the interests of the state ahead of those of its
citizens"); Judge Stephen Reinhardt, The Supreme Court, the Death Penalty, and the Harris
Case, 102 YALE L. J. 205, 215 (1992) ("[T]he responsibility.., lies with the Supreme
Court, not the lower courts.").
14 See id. at 214.
15 See, e.g., Reinhardt, supra note 65 at 350 ("There was little doubt in their minds or in
mine that, were we to rule in Thompson's favor, the Supreme Court would swiftly reverse
us once again-and perhaps this time the five-Justice majority would order us whipped or
put in the stockade.").
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value of percolation. 76 She attributes this trend to the dominance of law clerks,
as well as the Justices' desire to be seen as "original. '77 In the same article
Judge Wald talks about a possible "parlor maid complex" among lower court
judges, though she then goes on to note the extraordinary amount of power that
lower court judges in the United States do possess, compared to most other
constitutional democracies. 78 These reactions are undoubtedly due in part to
transient political differences between the Supreme Court and lower courts,
79
especially with regards to the Ninth Circuit's tussles with the Supreme Court
over the death penalty.80 However, the content and tone of the criticism
suggests that there may be more going on than political dissatisfaction.
On the whole, however, lower court judges are remarkably quiescent
regarding, and even supportive of, the upward shift in rulemaking power
within the federal judiciary. Explicit criticisms of the Supreme Court by lower
court judges are relatively rare, even among prominent and otherwise self-
confident judges,81 probably because of the judges' perceptions of what
propriety requires. For example, Judge Posner's opinion in State Oil v. Kahn
might be read as criticizing the current Court's "strident" disapproval of
lower court underruling, 82 but if so it is far from explicit. And aside from any
concerns about propriety, lower court judges are far from unanimous in
chafing at the Court's attitudes and accumulation of power. As Sanford
Levinson has eloquently written, "the Supreme Court, and much scholarly and
76 Honorable Patricia M. Wald, Upstairs/Downstairs at the Supreme Court: Implications
of the 1991 Term for the Constitutional Work of the Lower Courts, 61 U. CINN. L. REv. 771,
792-93 (1993) (observing that the Supreme Court "appeared not to rely heavily on the
rationales of the lower courts"). Indeed, Judge Henry Friendly of the Second Circuit noted
this reality, and also expressed frustration, as early as 1972. See Friendly, supra note 70 at
407.
7 See Wald, supra note 76, at 792-93.
78 See id. at 772.
79 This was especially evident during the late Carter and early Reagan Administrations.
At this time, the Supreme Court was more politically conservative than the lower courts, a
situation that persisted until President Reagan's lower court appointments began to fill up
the judiciary. As a result, lower court judges resented being forced to implement holdings
and legal rules with which they disagreed. Even today, despite the general homogeneity and
conservatism of the federal judiciary at all levels, that sort of political tension has not
disappeared entirely.
80 See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
81 For an empirical study of judicial prominence, see William M. Landes, ET AL.,
Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Court of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 271 (1998) (using "the number of citations to the published opinions of judges on the
federal courts of appeals to measure the influence of individual judges").
82 Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1363 (7th Cir.1996), rev'd,522 U.S. 3 (1997)
("The Supreme Court has told the lower federal courts, in increasingly emphatic, even
strident, terms, not to anticipate an overruling of a decision by the Court; we are to leave the
overruling to the Court itself.").
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ordinary understanding, views the 'inferior court' as the simple (and perhaps
simple-minded) enforcer of the Supreme Court's dictates, however wise or
unwise they may appear to the hapless judge below. '83 Even among lower
court judges, this view appears to be fairly common. For example, Judge
Alfred Goodwin of the Ninth Circuit has described the lower courts as
"messengers who translate" for the Court.84 And Judge Kenneth Ripple,
concurring in Kahn v. State Oil, made the remarkable argument that he felt
bound to apply the per se rule of Albrecht to the facts before the Seventh
Circuit because he was "unable to rule out the possibility that the Justices
might intend the per se rule to be broad enough to reach State Oil's conduct. '85
For a particularly extreme example of such self-abnegation, consider the
following comment by Judge Karen Henderson of the D.C. Circuit: "It is more
than misguided [to question Supreme Court decisions]-it is wrong. We are
not in the business of lamenting or celebrating decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. We are to follow them. Period. '86 A more reasoned, but
equally deferential, approach to Supreme Court precedent can be found in
Judge Reinhardt's dissent from the panel opinion in Watkins v. U.S. Army. 87 In
that case, Judge Reinhardt concluded, against his instincts and preferences, that
the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick8 8 required him to reject
an Equal Protection Challenge to the Army's policy of barring homosexuals
from military service, because "[a]n important part of the function of circuit
court judges is to interpret the Supreme Court's opinions. '89 These opinions
indicate that, among "inferior" federal judges, there is a growing acceptance of
the sharp division in the modem legal culture between the Supreme Court, with
its role as legislator for the judicial system,90 and all other courts.91
A strong sense of hierarchy is thus an established part of the current culture
of the federal judicial system.92 On first glance, moreover, this seems entirely
83 Levinson, supra note 38, at 845.
4 Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, How the Supreme Court Employs Inferior Courts as
Messengers, 75 OR. L. REV. 699, 700 (1996).
85 Khan, 93 F.3d at 1368 (Ripple, J., concurring).
86 Cole v. Bums Int'l Security Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1489 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(Henderson, J., dissenting).
87 847 F.2d 1329, 1353-1362 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("I am bound...
to apply the Constitution as it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court... whether or not
I agree with those interpretations.), withdrawn, 875 F.2d 699, 700 (9th Cir. 1989).
88 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (rejecting a due process challenge to a Georgia law forbidding
sodomy).
89 Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1354 (Reinhardt, J. dissenting).
I See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
91 Cf Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1396-97 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (opinion by Judge
Bork suggesting that whatever the propriety of the Supreme Court recognizing new, non-
textual constitutional rights, the lower courts should not engage in such activism).
92 Sanford Levinson has noted this tendency among lower federal courts, and has
attributed it to a fundamentally positivistic approach towards legal authority. See Levinson,
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appropriate and consistent with the constitutional design-after all, Article III
explicitly refers to federal courts other than the Supreme Court as "inferior
Courts,"93 and Article I, § 8 clarifies that they are "inferior to the Supreme
Court."94  The term "inferior," however, turns out to be somewhat more
ambiguous than first appears, a point famously debated by the Court in
Morrison v. Olson, where the Court defined the term "inferior officers" in
Article 11.95  One possible meaning of the word "inferior" is certainly
hierarchical-an inferior is one who is subordinate to, and under the command
of another, superior (or in the language of Article 11, "principal") officer or
court. This is the definition that Justice Scalia advocated in his dissent in
Morrison,96 and a number of academic commentators have defended this
definition.97 However, the hierarchical/subordination definition of inferiority is
not the only possible definition. "Inferior" can also mean less important,
because less powerful or possessing less authority and (in the judicial context)
jurisdiction. Indeed, this is the definition adopted by the majority in Morrison,
who found that the independent counsel is an inferior officer in part because of
her limited jurisdiction, not because she was clearly subordinate to the
Attorney General or any other officer.98 Whatever the strength of this holding
in interpreting the Article II term "inferior officers," 99 there are powerful
reasons to think that this is the best understanding of the term "inferior court"
in Article I1. As William Dodge has argued convincingly, at the time the
Constitution was written, with respect to courts at least the terms "inferior" and
"supreme" appear to have been understood as referring to importance, and
scope of jurisdiction, rather than exclusively (or even necessarily) to a
supra note 38, at 851-52 ("[T]he meaning applied to that notion in regard to 'inferior'
judges is ... remarkably positivistic ... .
93 U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1.
94 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (stating that Congress shall have the power "to constitute
Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court").
95 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671-72 (1988) (stating that the Independent Counsel
is an "inferior officer" because she is subject to removal, has limited duties, and is limited in
her jurisdiction).
96 See id. at 719 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he independent counsel is not an inferior
officer because she is not subordinate to any officer in the Executive Branch.").
97 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinions Clause, 82 VA. L. REv.
647, 668-69 & n.92 (1997) (observing that "[aln 'inferior officer... embodies a relational
concept" that includes subordination); Caminker, supra note 24, at 831-33 (commenting that
the term "inferior to" used in Article Ill "clearly suggests a direct relationship of
subordination").
98 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671-72 (explaining why the Independent Counsel is an inferior
officer).
99 Recent caselaw suggests that the Court itself may not have much faith in this definition
any longer. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662 (1997) ("Whether one is an
'inferior' officer depends on whether he has a superior.").
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hierarchical relationship.1 00 Other commentators support this position as
well, l0' and in my opinion it is the better view.'
0 2
In addition to its historical pedigree, a definition of "inferior" in Article III
that is tied to jurisdiction and importance seems to comport better with the
reality of the day-to-day business of the courts than the
subordination/supervision definition of "inferior." As a practical matter, lower
federal courts are not, and have never been, under the close supervision of the
Supreme Court in carrying out their day-to-day duties and functions. 10 3 A
typical district court judge, deciding a typical case, is just not greatly
concerned about the possibility of review by the Court, in the way that even
relatively low-level bureaucrats in the Executive Branch are likely to be
influenced by the views of their superiors. 1°4 Moreover, the Court simply lacks
the tools of discipline and control available in typical hierarchical
organizations. The Justices of the Supreme Court cannot fire lower court
judges, cannot demote them, and cannot even reduce or influence their
compensation. 10 5 Indeed, even the Court's ability to issue "commands" to
lower court judges is limited to remands in individual cases, rather than broad
directives. Of course, in addition to reviewing individual decisions the Court
100 William S. Dodge, Note, Congressional Control of Supreme Court Appellate
Jurisdiction: Why the Original Jurisdiction Clause Suggests an "Essential Role," 100 YALE
L. J. 1013, 1020-21 (1991) (stating that the words "supreme" and "inferior" seem to indicate
relative importance).
101 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:
Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1153, 1180 n.139 (1992)
(suggesting that the word "inferior" was used to distinguish between courts that were
subject to geographical and subject matter constraints and those that were not); David E.
Engdahl, What's in a Name? The Constitutionality of Multiple "Supreme" Courts, 66 IND.
L.J. 457, 475 n.95 (1991) ("[I]t was then common to describe one tribunal as inferior 'to'
another for a variety of reasons."); Paulsen, supra note 23, at 84-85 (1989) ("While lower
courts may be 'inferior' in the hierarchy... they are not constitutionally subordinate in
terms of either their duties under the Constitution or their relationship to higher courts).
1o In rejecting this reading of "inferior court," Professors Amar and Caminker rely
heavily on the language in Article I, § 8 describing lower courts as "inferior to the Supreme
Court" to defend their subordination reading. See Amar, supra note 97, at 668; Caminker,
supra note 24, at 828. However, that interpretation places a great deal of weight on one
somewhat ambiguous word, probably too much absent some evidence that the word was
chosen with care and forethought.
103 See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 100, at 1017 n.19 (noting that the Judiciary Act of 1789
left significant gaps in the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over lower federal courts,
including a lack of appellate jurisdiction, and thus supervisory control, in any criminal
cases).
1o Edward Purcell cites statistics suggesting that over 95% of decisions by the courts of
appeals are final. Purcell, supra note 61, at 722. The percentage of district court cases
never reviewed by the Supreme Court must, of course, be even higher.
105 See Paulsen, supra note 23, at 84-85 (noting that only Congress, via its impeachment
power, can control the lower federal courts).
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also creates precedent which is "binding" on the lower courts. But, as Evan
Caminker points out, precedent is truly binding only because of the power and
threat of appellate review. 106 In the modem world, the threat of review by the
Supreme Court is extremely limited, given practical and voluntarily adopted
constraints on the Court's docket, and the huge volume of federal litigation (to
say nothing of state litigation raising federal issues).107 Thus, in practice, for
all of the abstract claims of subordination, inferiority, and superiority, the
Supreme Court's ability to actually supervise the regular business of the
federal courts is almost nil. As Justice Scalia points out in his dissent in
Morrison (with of course a quite different emphasis), this lack of control is
quite inconsistent with the concept of inferiority as subordination. 10 8 Thus, the
term "inferior," as used in Article III, does not necessarily mean
"subordinate," nor is it necessarily a constitutional endorsement of a highly
hierarchical organization for the judiciary.
This limitation on the Supreme Court's practical authority illustrates the
importance, the novelty, and the questionable nature of the order issued by the
Court in the Harris case, which stripped the Ninth Circuit of jurisdiction over
all future claims raised by Harris to attempt to block his execution. 109 Such an
order does not constitute a normal exercise of the power of appellate review,
and indeed comes perilously close to a judicial usurpation of Congress's power
to create and empower the lower federal courts. 110 Charles Fried has defended
the Court's actions in Harris by invoking the Court's "supervisory power"
over lower federal courts.111 It is true that the Court has some sort of
supervisory authority over the "inferior" federal courts, including powers of
mandamus and the power to remand a case to a different judge. 112 It is
doubtful, however, that the power extends as far as the Court took it in Harris,
106 Caminker, supra note 24, at 824-25 ("The duty to obey hierarchical precedent tracks
the path of review followed by a particular case as it moves up the three federal judicial
tiers."); see also Dorf, supra note 28, at 672 (observing that appellate review adds effect to
notions of inferiority and superiority).
107 This inability is reflected in the Court's renunciation of any "error-correction" role
through the certiorari process. See ROBERT STERN, ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 373
(6th ed. 1986).
108 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 719 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If what was
meant was merely 'lower in station or rank' one would use instead a term such as 'lesser
officers."').
109 See Vasquez v. Harris, 503 U.S. 1000 (1992) ("No further stays of Robert Alton
Harris' execution shall be entered by the federal courts except upon order of this Court.").
"0 See Reinhardt, supra note 73 at 214 (questioning whether the Supreme Court's order
was a valid exercise of power).
"' See Charles Fried, Impudence, 1992 SuP. CT. REv. 155, 193 ("Superior courts have
always enjoyed the authority to issue not only propositions of law but executive decrees to
courts below, and to supervise them to make sure they are properly executed.").
112 See id. at 193-94 (discussing the Supreme Court's powers over the lower federal
courts).
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to prospectively strip a lower court of jurisdiction granted by Congress; even
Fried concedes that any exercise of "supervisory power" by the Court is
unusual and limited to the most extreme circumstances.1 13 In any event,
whatever the proper resolution of this debate, the events surrounding the Harris
execution illustrate well the severe limitations on the Supreme Court's power
to control lower federal courts.
These limitations not only provide important insights into the abstract
question of the relationship between the Supreme and lower federal courts,
they also have practical consequences. The most important form of power the
Court exercises over lower courts is of course the power of precedent, backed
up by the distant but ever-present threat of review and reversal. Because the
possibility of review is, however, extremely limited, the true force of the
Court's precedent must lie in the voluntary, good faith efforts of the lower
courts to follow it. And in most cases, there seems no doubt that federal judges
do in fact make every effort to apply the Court's precedent, in part no doubt
because that precedent is likely to comport with their own inclinations. But
what about those admittedly few cases where the Court's precedent is
controversial, and not necessarily in agreement with the views of other judges?
As Frederick Schauer points out, precedent has true significance only in that
situation.114 Even then, outright defiance of an explicit holding by the Court
remains exceedingly rare.115 But both evidence and observation suggest that
more subtle, subterranean defiance, through means such as reading Supreme
Court holdings narrowly, denying the logical implications of a holding, or
treating significant parts of opinions as dicta,1 6 is far from unusual. Edward
Purcell cites an impressive array of recent scholarship indicating that the lower
courts do not automatically implement "the rules of law laid down by the
Supreme Court."" 7 Evan Caminker also cites several studies, as well as a
13 See id. at 193-94 (calling the exercise of supervisory authority "rare").
114 Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 575-76 (1987).
115 See Caminker, supra note 24, at 819-20 (discussing the rare example of a lower
court judge refusing to follow precedent with which he disagreed); Levinson, supra note 38,
at 847-48 (noting that "inferior judges know their place, as it were, which is the enforcement
of the decisions of their superiors, whatever their own views"); Reinhardt, supra note 73, at
206 (discussing the execution of Robert Allen Harris and noting that "[wihatever our sorrow
over the systematic erosion of established rights, we must continue to apply whatever
decisions the Court issues. And we will do that. That is our constitutional obligation.").
"6 Of course, the distinction between dicta and holding is often far from clear. See
generally Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL L. REv. 1, 25 (1989)
(discussing the distinction between dictum and holding, "the existence of which all lawyers
are trained to acknowledge, but the determination of which proves in practice to be quite
controversial"); Dorf, supra note 34, at 2005-26 (discussing the holding/dictum distinction
and noting that lower courts are divided regarding their obligation to follow higher court
dicta, though prudence counsels following dicta to avoid reversal). Schauer, supra note 114,
at 579-80 (1987) (discussing the difference between dictum and holding).
"7 Purcell, supra note 61, at 724 & nn. 119-123 (discussing the ways in which trial
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pointed remark by Justice O'Connor, suggesting that avoidance of precedent is
far from uncommon.'
1 8
Recent experience tends to confirm this view. For example, in 1992 the
Court decided Lee v. Weisman, a case holding unconstitutional, over a
vigorous 4-justice dissent, a decision by a public school to permit religious
invocation and benediction prayers at a graduation ceremony. 119 Yet in Jones
v. Clear Creek Independent School District, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
in a case remanded by the Court for reconsideration in light of Lee, upheld a
school district's practice of permitting students to choose a student volunteer to
deliver prayers at a graduation ceremony.12° The facts of Jones may well have
been distinguishable from Lee, but the Fifth Circuit's decision fails to adhere to
the reasoning of Lee, since the Lee opinion emphasizes the coercive impact on
dissenting students of religious prayers at a graduation ceremony. 121 And
indeed, the Supreme Court subsequently confirmed, in Santa Fe Independent
School District v. Doe,122 that the Court's reasoning in Lee applies fully to
student-initiated prayer. Thus, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Jones almost
certainly reflects hostility to the Court's holding in Lee.
Similarly, in Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, a panel of the
Ninth Circuit struck down an ordinance prohibiting landlords from
discriminating against tenants on the basis of "marital status," finding that
application of the rule violated the constitutional rights of the plaintiff
landlords to the free exercise of religion. 123 In so holding, the Ninth Circuit
panel opinion distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Employment
courts expand and shift Supreme Court precedent).
11 Caminker, supra note 24, at 819 & n.8 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 500 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) and noting that judges
"know how to mouth the correct legal rules with ironic solemnity while avoiding those
rules' logical consequences").
19 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (holding that the Establishment Clause prohibits a religious
exercise "at a graduation ceremony in circumstances where ... young graduates who object
are induced to conform").
120 977 F.2d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1992); but see ACLU of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike
Regional Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1482) (3rd Cir. 1996) (en banc) (rejecting holding of
Jones and holding student-initiated prayers unconstitutional under Lee).
"2 This critique of the Jones decision is of course premised on the view that the
reasoning of an opinion has precedential force. For a defense of this position, see Dorf,
supra note 34, at 2008-09, 2029-40 (discussing whether dicta is binding precedent and
noting the need for a holding/dictum distinction based on rationales rather than facts and
outcomes).
122 120 S.Ct. 2266 (2000). That the Santa Fe case involved prayer at a football game
rather than a graduation ceremony provides no basis for distinguishing it from Jones, and
certainly the Court in Santa Fe did not appear to consider the distinction relevant.
123 165 F.3d 692, 702 (9th Cir. 1999), opinion withdrawn, reh'g en banc granted 192
F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18696 (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 2000) (en
banc).
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Division v. Smith,124 which held that the Free Exercise Clause does not prevent
a state from applying generally applicable laws even if the laws create a
substantial burden on the exercise of religion, by citing a "hybrid rights"
exception allegedly created by dictum in the Smith opinion. The court then
engaged in a highly sophistic analysis to determine that such "hybrid rights"
were in fact implicated in the Thomas case.' 25 The en banc 9th Circuit
ultimately reversed the panel opinion, but on ripeness and standing grounds
rather than substantive disagreement.
For yet another example of lower court avoidance of the logical implications
of a Supreme court decision, consider the D.C. Circuit's decision in Lamprecht
v. FCC,126 in which then-Judge (now Justice) Thomas authored an opinion
striking down the Federal Communications Commission's gender preference
policy in granting broadcasting licenses as violative of the Equal Protection
Clause, despite the fact that just two years earlier the Supreme Court had
upheld the FCC's minority preference policy in the same context.' 27 As Judge
Wald, a member of the D.C. Circuit has suggested, Lamprecht represented a
relatively clear instance of a lower court evading binding Court precedent
under the thinnest pretense of distinguishing it. 1
28
In the area of affirmative action, the Court has expressed a great deal of
hostility to all race conscious government policies, mandating the use of the
highest, "strict" standard of scrutiny in all such situations, and suggesting
broadly that such policies may be adopted only to remedy prior
124 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990).
125 The Thomas court determined that a plaintiff invoking the "hybrid-rights" exception
must "make out a 'colorable claim' that a companion right has been infringed." 165 F.3d at
705. The court then held that a law forbidding a landlord from discriminating against
tenants on the basis of marital status, or inquiring regarding the marital status of prospective
tenants, raised "colorable" constitutional claims under both the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. See id. at 707-711.
While a complete discussion of these areas of law is not possible here, suffice to say that
both conclusions are extremely difficult to defend under existing doctrine, not least because
if the Ninth Circuit is correct in Thomas, then essentially all regulation of rental housing
raises colorable constitutional claims.
126 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
127 Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Of course, as it turns out the demise of
Metro Broadcasting might suggest that Justice Thomas was prophetic in refusing to follow
it; but as the Court's own doctrine discussed in Part I, supra, indicates, that hardly justifies
Justice Thomas's non-acquiescence.
128 See Wald, supra note 76 at 798-99 (discussing how the Supreme Court in Metro
Broadcasting "had specifically said that it was not ruling on the gender-preference policy,
though many thought its reasoning would be controlling," and that then-Judge Thomas
managed to distinguish the two cases by finding that Congress' "authorization of the
preference for women in contrast to the minority preference, was unconstitutional because it
lacked sufficient empirical evidence of a nexus between female-owned stations and discrete
women's programming").
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discrimination. 29 At least one appellate court has read these decisions as
holding that only remedial purposes may justify state affirmative action. 130 Yet
in two recent decisions, Wittmer v. Peters'3 ' and Hunter v. Regents of the
University of California,132 the Seventh and Ninth Circuits respectively have
upheld race conscious state programs, despite the lack of any claimed remedial
purpose.
Another example of a lower court sidestepping the implications of a
Supreme Court precedent is Judge Alex Kozinski's opinion on remand from
the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.133 In
Daubert,134 the Supreme Court substantially altered the law regarding the
admission of scientific evidence in federal courts, displacing the previously
widely-used Frye "general acceptance" test with a significantly more complex
requirement of "scientific validity," and creating a rule which emphasized the
trial court's discretionary power to admit or exclude expert testimony. 135 In
the course of creating the new standard, the Daubert Court also reversed and
remanded a decision of the Ninth Circuit excluding particular expert testimony.
Yet on remand, the Ninth Circuit re-affirmed its decision to exclude the expert
testimony as a matter of law, without seeing the need to remand to the trial
court; and in the course of the opinion on remand, Judge Kozinski roundly
criticized the rule adopted by the Court in Daubert, suggesting that it was
129 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (noting that
"[f]ederal racial classifications, like those of a State, must serve a compelling government
interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest"); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion) (noting that classifications based
on race are subject to strict scrutiny and that such classifications may lead to "stigmatic
harm... unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings"); see also Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. at 611 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that
"the Government possesses a compelling interest in remedying the effects of identified
racial discrimination"); Hunter v. Regents of the University of California, 190 F.3d 1061
(9th Cir. 1999) (Beezer, J., dissenting) (discussing whether race-based classifications should
only be used for remedial purposes).
131 See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944-45 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that non-remedial
state interests, such as diversity, will never justify racial classifications).
131 87 F.3d 916, 919 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 117 S. Ct. 949 (1997) (upholding a
race-conscious hiring program in a state youth penal program adopted in order to assure the
presence of minority officers in light of the predominantly minority inmate population).
132 190 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding a race-conscious admission program
at a "laboratory" elementary school run by U.C.L.A., adopted in order to ensure an
ethnically representative sample of students necessary to conduct educational research).
133 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).
134 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
131 See id. at 589-92; see generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE, THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ch. 1 (1997). In General Electric
Company v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 138-39 (1997), the Court confirmed the discretionary
nature of the trial court's admissibility determination.
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unworkable, and placed a "daunting" burden on lower courts. 136 Again, it is
difficult not to conclude that the Ninth Circuit's decision not to remand the
case to the district court was driven to a considerable extent by hostility to the
Court's new doctrine.
An even more stark example of lower court evasion of longstanding
precedent can be found in the Fourth Circuit's recent decision in United States
v. Dickerson,137 where the appeals court held that, contrary to thirty years of
precedent, the Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona138 was not binding in
federal courts because of a statute enacted by Congress soon after that
decision, purporting to overrule Miranda. The Supreme Court subsequently
reversed this decision (by a 7-2 vote), indicating that there are limits to the
degree of evasion a lower court can engage in before the Court takes notice,
and acts.
39
Finally, Alan Brownstein has collected extensive authority suggesting that
the lower courts have been quite reluctant to follow the Supreme Court's
highly deferential approach to content-neutral regulations of speech,
established in cases such as Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence'
4°
and Ward v. Rock Against Racism,141 and have instead enforced the
intermediate scrutiny standard quite vigorously, striking down a number of
speech-restrictive regulations. 14
2
The studies cited by Professors Purcell and Caminker suggest that the above
decisions are not aberrational in the willingness they evince to evade and avoid
Supreme Court precedent (though they probably do not reflect the norm
either). 143 The Court does, however, have tools which might permit it to at
least limit the ability of lower courts to engage in such avoidance. Because
lower courts are rarely willing to explicitly flout binding precedent, or even to
be perceived as doing so, if the Supreme Court were to establish and explicate
clear, doctrinal rules with determinate consequences, such rules might be quite
effective in actually binding lower court decision-making and limiting the
avoidance of precedent. In fact, however, as many commentators have noted,
136 43 F.3d at 1315-1316.
.,137 166 F.3d 667, 692 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd 120 S.Ct. 2326 (2000).
138 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
139 Dickerson v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 2326 (2000).
140 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
141 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
142 See Alan E. Brownstein, Alternative Maps for Navigating the First Amendment Maze,
16 CONST. COMM. 101, 115-16 n.45 (1999) (citing extensive caselaw).
143 See Purcell, supra note 61, at 697 (describing conservative jurists' challenge to the
Warren Court's authority); Caminker, supra note 23, at 3-4 (discussing cases where lower
courts avoided Supreme Court precedent). For a related but broader argument that
unpopular Supreme Court decisions can have limited impact because of public officials'
reluctance to enforce them, see Jesse H. Choper, Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions
Upholding Individual Constitutional Rights, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1984) (citing the
example of the school prayer decisions).
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the current trend on the Court is a movement away from rules, and towards
more open-textured and flexible "standards." 144  The reasons for this
development are complex, and I have elsewhere developed in detail at least
one possible explanation; 145 but briefly, this Court, dominated as it is by
political moderates, appears to be driven towards standards and balancing tests
as a way to avoid often difficult and potentially unpopular decisions and to
simultaneously avoid binding itself in the future or having to overrule its
precedents with too great a frequency. 146 Of course, however, this greater
freedom comes at a cost, which is a lessening of the Court's control over lower
court decision-making, an effect which is exaggerated by the Court's inability
to oversee, and seemingly complete lack of attention to, the application of its
precedents by the lower courts.
147
The above discussion paints a complex, if somewhat troubling picture of the
Supreme Court and its relationship with the lower federal courts. On the one
hand, the realities of docket growth as well as internal pressures on the Court
towards doctrinal adoption of more open-textured standards, has systematically
lessened the Court's ability to control and supervise the lower federal courts.
On the other hand, through such devices as the Rodriguez de Quijas/Agostini
prohibition on "underruling," the Court's increasing rejection of "percolation"
and shared responsibility within the judiciary for doctrinal development, and in
extreme cases the sorts of chastisement on display in the Harris and Thompson
executions, the Court has sought to reassert and even increase its hierarchical
authority over lower courts, and to separate itself out from the rest of the
judiciary as a way of concentrating power at the top. The result is a delicate
balance. The questions that remain, of course, are the more normative ones of
what is the appropriate relationship between the Supreme Court and the
144 See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943, 1004 (1987) (discussing the rise of balancing as a form of constitutional
reasoning and noting that "[b]alancing has turned us away from the Constitution, supplying
'reasonable' policymaking in lieu of theoretical investigations of rights, principles, and
structures."); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)Evolution of Constitutional
Doctrine, 30 CONN. L. REv. 961, 963-65 (1998) (noting that balancing dominates
constitutional law today and discussing the implications of balancing for individual rights);
Louis Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1022
(1978) (discussing the rise of balancing as a form of constitutional reasoning); see generally
Kathleen Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 26 (1992)
(describing how the split in the Supreme Court in the 1991 term can be explained by the
split in methodologies).
141 See Bhagwat, supra note 144 at 978-84 (offering the unique institutional nature of the
Supreme Court and other aspects of the US legal culture).
146 See id. at 981; Sullivan, supra note 144 at 100-02, 122.
147 See Caminker, supra note 23 at 59 & nn. 210-11; Bhagwat, supra note 144 at 991-93
(noting that "the Supreme Court's current doctrinal structure fits badly with the institutional
role of the Court as a creator of rules for other courts (and non-judicial decision-makers) to
follow").
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"inferior" federal courts, and what are the costs and benefits of the Court's
current attitude and approach.
III. LEGITIMACY AND THE LIMITS OF THE "JUDICIAL POWER"
Almost half a century ago, Justice Jackson made the following comment
regarding the role of the Supreme Court: "There is no doubt that if there were a
super-Supreme Court, a substantial proportion of our reversals of state courts
would also be reversed. We are not final because we are infallible, but we are
infallible only because we are final."
148
More recently, in Hutto v. Davis, the Court echoed this sentiment, but with a
subtly different emphasis:
More importantly, however, the Court of Appeals could be viewed as
having ignored, consciously or unconsciously, the hierarchy of the federal
court system created by the Constitution and Congress. Admittedly, the
Members of this Court decide cases "by virtue of their commissions, not
their competence." [B]ut unless we wish anarchy to prevail within the
federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by the
lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those courts
may think it to be.' 49
Both of these statements appear to reflect the same basic sentiments about the
powers and limitations of the Court. But in fact, they are quite different in
their tone. Underlying the oft-quoted passage from Justice Jackson, generally
invoked to argue in favor of limited Supreme Court or federal jurisdiction, is a
subtle assumption: that the Supreme Court when it engages in review is no
different from any other court in its fundamental, institutional nature. It is
supreme because it is final, but it is still a court. By the time of Hutto v. Davis,
however, a shift in attitudes has occurred from a certain humility, rooted in a
recognition of fundamental equality between courts, to a naked assertion of
authority, and power, which emphasizes the lack of equality and congruence
between the Court and all other courts. At a more fundamental, though closely
related, level moreover, the excerpts from Brown and Hutto also reveal a shift
in the Court's perception of its own role in the judicial system. In Brown,
Justice Jackson spoke of the Court's power of review, and the need to exercise
it with caution. In Hutto, the Court speaks instead of the Court's power to
establish precedents, and the absolute obligation of all federal courts, rooted in
the hierarchical structure created by Article III, to follow those precedents
without question. I have already discussed and criticized the Court's view of
hierarchy and Article 111.150 I now wish to turn to the more basic question of
the Court's view of its own fundamental role.
148 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
149 Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374-75 (1982) (per curiam).
'1o See supra notes 92-108 and accompanying text.
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A. Legitimacy: The Court as Legislature
The Supreme Court is different from all other federal courts, and from most
state courts (though some state courts of last resort share some of the Supreme
Court's special characteristics). The Court's day-to-day operations differ from
those of other courts in many ways. For example, the Supreme Court's docket
is today almost entirely discretionary. 151 In exercising that discretion, and
choosing which cases to decide on the merits, the Court focuses almost
exclusively on the legal issue posed by the case rather than on the details of the
dispute between the litigants. 152 Furthermore, the Court will often delay
resolving a legal issue until it has "percolated" in the lower courts, so that the
Court has the benefit of multiple perspectives.
53
Even after it has decided that it should resolve an issue, the Court may
choose to pass up cases presenting the issue until a case with suitable facts is
presented. When the Court finally grants certiorari in a case and then decides
it, the Court's opinions on the merits tend to focus almost exclusively on
abstract doctrinal and policy issues, with essentially no discussion of the facts
and equities of the particular case in front if it. Indeed, even after it has crafted
a new legal standard, the modem Court has displayed an increasing tendency
to remand the case to a lower court to apply that standard, rather than to fully
resolve the dispute before it as most courts would do as a matter of course.
154
Finally, Erwin Chemerinsky has noted a recent trend on the Court of reaching
out to decide issues which were not presented in the petition for certiorari, and
were not briefed or argued by the parties. 55 All of these are well-accepted and
today largely uncontroversial aspects of the Court's decision-making process.
But taken together, they emphasize just how far the functions of the modem
Supreme Court have drifted from the traditional judicial role of adversarial
dispute resolution, as well as the general acceptance of this fact.
156
For all practical purposes, then, the modem Supreme Court does not resolve
151 See 28 U.S.C. §§1254, 1257 (1993) (providing for Supreme Court appellate review
upon writ of certiorari); ROBERT STERN, ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 40 (6th ed.
1996); GEOFFREY R. STONE, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 145 (3d ed. 1996) (describing
the Supreme Court's discretionary jurisdiction).
152 See id. at 145 (describing the Supreme Court's criteria for granting review).
153 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
154 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Turner
Broadcasting System v. Federal Communications Commission, 512 U.S. 622 (1994);
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
115 Erwin Chemerinsky, The New Judicial Activism, Cal. Law., Feb. 2000, at 25-26.
156 Further indication of the extent to which the Court sees itself as a creator of binding
rules can be found in the modern Court's attitude, discussed in Part I, towards its own
precedents, and lower courts' obligations to follow them. See supra, Part I. As noted there,
the Court's uncompromising attitude towards the binding effects of its precedents, even if
their reasoning is outmoded and inconsistent with later decisions, reveals an underlying
assumption that for the Court, reasons do not matter, all that matters is holdings--or put
differently, all that matters is what rule the Court has adopted. See supra, Part I.
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disputes between litigants, it does not decide cases, and it does not enforce
legal rights or duties. 157 Instead, the Court makes rules.158 That courts, and the
Supreme Court in particular, make law is of course unsurprising.159 What is
surprising is that the Supreme Court seems to make law in the same way as
Congress and other legislatures-by announcing abstract rules. We do not call
the law made by the Court statutes, or regulations, we call them precedents and
doctrine, but they are rules nonetheless. Moreover, given the scrivener's care
with which the lower courts parse Supreme Court opinions in seeking to
identify applicable doctrine, 160 there is, in truth, little meaningful difference
between the effect of a congressional statute, and a new doctrinal rule adopted
by the Court, from the point of view of the rest of the judicial system.
161 Put
differently, the traditional judicial distinction between dictum and a holding
seems to play an increasingly insignificant role in the Court's opinions
formulating the "rule" that they create, and subsequently in lower courts'
decisions analyzing and applying those rules. 162 This process unquestionably
157 I do not want to overstate this point. There are no doubt instances in which the Court
simply chooses to decide a case, because of its importance. The Watergate tapes case,
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), was no doubt an example, and so probably was
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997). However, such cases are notable primarily for their
rarity.
158 In this respect, the Supreme Court more closely resembles a European-style
Constitutional Court than a traditional Anglo-American court. However, the U.S. Supreme
Court in fact does exist within a broader judicial system with which it shares its authority,
and its decisions have the force of precedent, making abstract rulemaking much more
problematic than in the European context.
159 See BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESs 69 (1921), (quoting
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). For a
detailed description, and defense, of the Court's role as a creator of doctrine, see Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REv. 56, 106-126, 149-
152 (1997). I should add that I completely agree with the thrust of Professor Fallon's
analysis in this regard; it is not that fact that the Court makes doctrine-or law-that I
question, it is the way in which it does so. See infra notes 185-189 and accompanying text.
16o See, e.g., Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 704-07 (9th
Cir. 1999), rev'd 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18696 (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 2000) (en banc) (parsing
dictum in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), to determine the proper scope of
a "hybrid rights" exception to Smith).
161 One difference that does exist, of course, is that the Court's decisions are not subject
to presidential veto, or any other independent review, for example by the judiciary.
162 For a general argument that what courts treat as "holdings" are often technically dicta,
see Schauer, supra note 114, at 579-82 (1987) (arguing that the articulated characterization
of a precedent can be considered mere dicta); cf Dorf, supra note 34, at 2035-40 (arguing
that Article II requires courts to treat the rationales offered by prior decisions as the
"holding" of that decision, even if the rationale was broader than necessary). It should be
noted that if the Court really did give the rationales underlying its decisions precedential
force, as opposed to merely the "rules" enunciated therein, this would go a long way
towards limiting the force of the rule of Rodriguez de Quijas, since in that situation later
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began, and perhaps reached its apogee, during the Warren and early Burger
Courts, 163 but it continues to dominate the Court's decision-making today. 164
The Court's almost complete abandonment of its dispute resolution function
in favor of abstract rulemaking appears to be a modem phenomenon. Of
course, there have always been "great" cases best known for establishing rules
rather than resolving disputes-Marbury165 and McCulloch'66 come to mind-
and no one would accuse, for example, Chief Justice Marshall of being shy
about exercising the court's law- and policymaking powers. 167 Moreover, the
evolution in the Court's role from a "court of 'law' [into] a forum for
'statesmanship' was first observed, and lauded (because of his political
hostility to the lower federal courts), by Felix Frankfurter in 1928.168 However,
until recently "great" cases were the exception rather than the rule. A perusal
of the U.S. Reports during the first half of this century demonstrates the extent
to which the Court of that time devoted its energies to resolving seemingly
trivial, and certainly doctrinally insignificant disputes. The current Court will
not deign to perform this task, even if it means leaving its docket half-empty.
decisions would overrule previous ones with inconsistent rationales. However, as noted
earlier, that is clearly not what the Court does. I am grateful to Michael Doff for this
insight.
163 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165-65 (1973) (adopting a complex, trimester-
based rule regarding regulation of abortions); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)
(holding that the Fifth Amendment requires police to provide suspects in custody with
specified warnings); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (establishing "actual
malice" for libel actions brought by public officials).
164 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235-37 (1995) (adopting
"strict scrutiny" standard of review for federal affirmative action programs, with little
analysis of the particular highway construction program at issue, or the consequences of the
Court's new standard for that program); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (adopting "undue burden" standard for previability
abortion regulations); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882-90 (1990)
(reconceptualizing previous caselaw and adopting expansive new rule that no scrutiny is
required under the Free Exercise Clause of generally applicable laws which burden religious
exercise).
165 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
166 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
167 See, e.g., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819)
(establishing that a corporate charter was a contract between the chartering state and the
chartered corporation, thus implicating the Contracts Clause of the Constitution);
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (adopting a broad interpretation of
the "necessary and proper" clause of Article I of the Constitution); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S.
(6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (holding that legislative rescission of a previous land sale obtained
through bribery violates the Contracts Clause of the Constitution); Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (deciding that the Supreme Court has the power to void any
legislative act that conflicts with the Constitution).
168 Purcell, supra note 61, at 702 (quoting FRANKFURTER & JAMES LANDIS, THE BUSINESS
OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 290-91 (1928)).
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Edward Purcell notes that well into the 20th century, litigation involving the
federal government (including civil and criminal cases) constituted a very
significant part of the docket of the federal judiciary, including the Supreme
Court. 169 Moreover, the language and structure of Article III, and in particular
the structure of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, suggest that at the
time of the framing the Court's primary significance was viewed in terms of
dispute resolution, albeit the resolution of important disputes. Thus, Article III
grants the Court original jurisdiction "[in all cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a
Party." 170 These are not cases which are particularly likely to involve difficult
legal issues. Rather, they are cases where the facts and a proper resolution of
the dispute itself has potential national significance.'
71
To some extent, it is to be expected, and indeed perhaps inevitable that the
modern Court's role has shifted so strongly towards rulemaking away from
dispute resolution. The enormous growth during this century in the size of the
federal judiciary, and of the docket of the lower federal courts, 172 has made it
essentially impossible for the Court to engage in meaningful "error correction,"
which is to say taking and resolving cases merely because the lower court got
it wrong. 173 Thus, the notion of the Supreme Court as a court of ultimate
appeal, available to vindicate rights improperly denied below, is necessarily
dead. 17 4 However, the growth of the federal docket does not necessarily
preclude the Court from focusing on dispute resolution by devoting its
resources to correction of gross errors, as well as resolving important cases or
cases in areas which the Court feels are particularly sensitive (as the language
169 See id. at 691.
170 U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2.
171 For a similar argument, see William S. Dodge, supra note 100, at 1024-29 (proposing
that Article III's original jurisdiction clause is explained by the sensitivity of the cases as
well as the dignity of the parties involved); see also Purcell, supra note 61, at 692 n.42
(diversity and alienage jurisdiction of the lower federal courts were considered "critical
'national' matters during early Republic).
172 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 391, Table
A.2 (1996).
173 See Purcell, supra note 61, at 722 (suggesting that over 95% of decisions by the court
of appeals are final). For an argument that this is appropriate, and indeed that appellate
courts generally should not seek to "do justice" as between individual litigants, see Evan
Tsen Lee, Principled Decision Making and the Proper Role of Federal Appellate Courts:
The Mixed Questions Conflict, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 235, 250-56 (1991) (arguing that notions
of efficiency, credibility, and deference counsel in favor of limited appellate review).
174 Though perhaps not in the popular imagination-consider the still-common use of the
phrase "all the way to the Supreme Court." See, e.g., United Press International, Teacher's
Free Services Opposed (Williamstown, VT Nov. 22, 1999); Ray Tessler, Businessman
Warms to His War on Smoking Ban, L.A. TIMES Nov. 24, 1998, at B1 (reporting that
citizens were prepared to fight the city's anti-smoking laws "all the way to the Supreme
Court").
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of Article III suggests was originally envisioned). Indeed, in one area-
enforcement of the death penalty-this is apparently exactly what the Court
does. 17 5 Thus, the explosion of the federal docket alone cannot explain the
Court's shift away from a dispute resolution function.
A better explanation for the evolution of the Court's role might be found in
the twin concepts of guidance and uniformity. As the federal judiciary's size
and docket have grown, so inevitably has the incidence of disagreement and
doctrinal diversion among the courts of appeals. Furthermore, as the number
of federal statutes, regulations, and agencies has exploded, so has the sheer
number of different types of issues that federal courts must resolve. As a
result, assuming that it is desirable for the Supreme Court to provide guidance
to the lower courts on how to address these issues, and to try to maintain
uniformity of federal law by minimizing the extent of disagreement among the
courts of appeals, it seems inevitable that the Supreme Court today will end up
spending much of its time setting forth rules, and resolving legal disputes
between the lower courts, rather than deciding concrete cases. The values of
uniformity, however, strike me as often being overstated. After all, on issues
governed by state law we tolerate substantial disuniformity as a product of our
federal system, with 50 different state supreme courts creating 50 often
inconsistent and certainly unreconciled sets of rules (albeit this disuniformity is
not over interpretation of the same statutory or constitutional language-
though from the point of view of private citizens why that should matter is less
clear). And yet the Republic has not fallen. In contrast, there are after all only
twelve regional courts of appeals, and furthermore the extent of disagreement
between them seems likely to be less serious than among 50 quite
heterogeneous state court systems. 176 I do not want to overstate this point-the
desire for guidance and uniformity certainly provides a partial justification for
the Court's strong move towards a primarily rulemaking role. But it is hard to
believe that it is a complete justification. 177
175 See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 263-64 (1999) (affirming petitioner's
capital sentence and rejecting his habeas corpus petition based on ineffective assistance of
counsel); Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 116-17 (1999) (reversing and remanding
petitioner's capital punishment sentence based on a violation of the Sixth Amendment);
Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 566 (1998) (holding that the court of appeals
committed a grave abuse of discretion in recalling its mandate denying all of petitioner's
habeas relief); O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 151-52 (1997) (refusing to apply
retroactively a new rule of law that would disturb petitioner's death penalty and entitle him
to resentencing); Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 540-41 (1992) (vacating and remanding a
death sentence).
176 Though, of course, state courts also resolve federal issues, thereby increasing the
opportunity for disuniformity. However, outside of the area of criminal procedure, most
important federal issues do seem to make their way into federal court.
177 For a similar argument, see Dorf, supra note 67, at 65-67 (discussing the role that the
Supreme Court assumes in assuring the uniformity of federal law and noting the benefit of
temporary disuniformity as a way for the Court to obtain knowledge).
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At bottom, therefore, it is hard not to conclude that at least part of what has
happened in the Supreme Court is a simple power grab. Dispute resolution is
boring, compared to rulemaking, and it is certainly a far slower and less
effective way of projecting power.178 After all, resolving a dispute changes the
lives only of the parties before a court, and announcing a narrow holding may
affect relatively few people. In contrast, adopting a broad new rule can change
the lives of thousands or millions. The question that arises, then, is whether we
should consider this to be problematic. The answer, I think, is "yes," though a
qualified yes. After all, as noted above, the Court is a governmental institution
and therefore can be expected to seek to maximize its own power, as
rulemaking enables it to do. 179 The problem is, the power that the Court
exercises today is not the type of power which was confided to it by the
Constitution. Article III of the Constitution grants to the Supreme Court (and
the inferior federal courts) the "judicial power of the United States." As the
Court itself has noted, the essence of the judicial power is that of resolving
concrete disputes between individuals, or put differently, "[t]he province of the
court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals."'180 Many scholars have
agreed, emphasizing that the fundamental role of courts, as understood
traditionally and even today, is to resolve a particular dispute and to grant a
judgment, not to pronounce law.
181
Moreover, this distinction makes a lot of sense. Courts are not particularly
good at formulating broad rules. Not only do they lack a democratic pedigree,
but more importantly, they lack the institutional capacity to collect data
regarding or otherwise assess the need for, and likely impact of, any particular
178 But see Lee, supra note 173, at 250-56 (defending a primarily law-developing
function for appellate courts).
179 See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
180 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992), (quoting Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-
52 (1984) (discussing how the judicial power extends only to cases and controversies);
Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881 (1983) (arguing that the judicial function is limited to
deciding cases between individuals); but see Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L.
REv. 227, 277-79 (1990) (positing other primary judicial functions, such as checking the
political branches); Owen Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 9
(1979) (defining function of judiciary as "to give concrete meaning and application to our
constitutional values").
181 See Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 123, 126-27 (1999) (advocating the role of the courts to decide cases and
controversies rather than pronouncing the law); Michael Moore, Precedent, Induction, and
Ethical Generalization, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 186-87 (Laurance Goldstein ed. 1987); cf
Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments,
15 CARDOZO L. REv. 43, 44 (1993) (arguing that from the perspective of the Executive
Branch, judicial opinions should be understood simply as explanations for judgments, not as
sources of binding law).
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rule. 182 The doctrine of stare decisis also makes judicial rulemaking more
dangerous than legislative rulemaking since future courts will feel obliged to
adhere to it even though they are in no worse, and probably a better position to
choose a rule, thereby imparting to judicially-adopted rules a life of their own.
Legislatures in contrast feel no such compunction. 183 These institutional
weaknesses of the Court are very much on display in several arenas into which
the modem Court has chosen to enter with broad pronouncements, including
the abortion debate and the Court's recent attacks on affirmative action. I have
no intention here of stepping into the endless, and ultimately fruitless debate
over the propriety of the Court engaging in "policymaking" and entering into
the great moral debates of our time. It seems to me that such entry is
inevitable, especially given the repeated failure of the political branches to deal
adequately with those issues. What the above discussiofi does suggest,
however, is that, for institutional reasons, it matters how the Court enters into
these debates-a point which mirrors recent arguments made by Cass Sunstein
in favor of a "minimalist" judicial approach to decision-making. 184
It should be emphasized that I am not advocating a retreat from judicial
rulemaking, or the use of clear, doctrinal standards. 185 Indeed, I have argued
extensively elsewhere that clear, doctrinal rules have a great deal of value, and
that one of the unfortunate trends of the modem Court has been a retreat from
clear rules in constitutional law, towards standards and balancing tests.
186
Mine is a narrower point, directed at the process through which courts
formulate such doctrinal rules. Courts are generally better at formulating
182 See infra notes 206-209 and accompanying text. Judge Posner has put it thus: "it is a
disservice to courts, as well as a common source of erroneous predictions concerning the
scope and direction of the law, to treat a judicial opinion as if it were a statute, every clause
of which was Law. It is difficult to write a judicial opinion without making some general
statements by way of background and explanation. But in a system of case law such
statements can be misleading if carelessly lifted from the case-specific contexts in which
they were originally uttered." All-Tech Telecom, Inc. v. Amway Corp., 174 F.3d 862, 866
(7th Cir. 1999).
183 See Dorf, supra note 38 (arguing that statutes are the product of majoritarian
compromises that can be altered at any time).
184 See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 259-60 (1999) (defining minimalism as "an effort to limit the width and
depth of judicial decisions); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutional Myth-Making: Lessons from
the Dred Scott Case, Occasional Papers from The Law School, The University of Chicago
No. 37 1996, at 3 (proposing that courts "decide cases rather than set down broad rules");
Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 6, 32-33
(1996) (advocating a minimalist approach, especially in highly contentious areas that have
receive a lot of democratic attention).
185 Cf. Fallon, supra note 159, at 106-126 (outlining the importance of doctrine in the
Supreme Court).
186 See Bhagwat, supra note 144, at 989-1005 (1998) (criticizing balancing
methodologies for their lack of predictability).
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doctrinal rules over time, through the device of resolving disputed cases, since
such a process gives them access to more empirical data, as well as the insights
of a greater number of decision-makers and perspectives, spread over a longer
time period. In other words, it is not the fact of rulemaking itself by the Court
which is problematic, it is the abrupt declaration of broad, forward-looking
rules by a Court which has essentially no awareness of how those rules will
play out in practice.
The process of decision-making I advocate here for the Court is one of
incremental rulemaking, through case-by-case formulation of narrow rules
necessary to resolve particular disputes rather than through broad legislation.
This type of process has strong roots in the common law tradition, and best
utilizes the institutional strengths of the judiciary. 187 The methodology through
which the Court formulates those rules, whether through so-called "definitional
balancing," or through a more interpretational process, is less relevant to the
concerns expressed here. 188 The common-law process of lawmaking, however,
has costs, most obviously in terms of delay and legal uncertainty during the
period in which clear rules are being formulated-though so long as the end
result of the rulemaking process is a body of relatively clear rules, the
uncertainty need not be permanent. However, the costs imposed by this
temporary uncertainty in legal standards must be balanced against the error
costs associated with the creation of broad, forward-looking rules as the
modem Court is inclined to do. If the observations made in this paper are
correct, there is reason to think that the latter costs are extremely significant.
Furthermore, since the modern Court's broad decisions tend to come in the
guise of flexible "standards,"' 189 the actual amount of certainty that these
rulings provide is quite limited. Thus, on the whole, the error costs created by
bad rules seem greater than the costs of delay and temporary uncertainty.
To reiterate, all courts make doctrine, and so all courts legitimately make
rules, including federal courts in exercising their Article III authority.
Furthermore, in so doing all courts also make policy choices. It is the way in
which the modem Supreme Court has chosen to exercise its undisputed
rulemaking function that raises issues of legitimacy. Traditionally, the Court's
exercise of its law-declaring and policymaking powers was closely tied to its
dispute resolution function, in all but the most unusual cases. Today, that link
has been largely dissolved, due to the Court's abandonment of dispute
resolution as a significant part of its activities.
One consequence of the above-described evolution in the Supreme Court's
decision-making is a sharp contrast, decreed by the Court itself, between the
way in which it exercises the judicial power of the United States, and the way
in which all other courts do it. For a stark example, consider again Agostini v.
187 See discussion infra Part III.B.
"I See Bhagwat, supra note 144, at 972-75 & n.53 (discussing how the Supreme Court
applies strict scrutiny review).
189 See supra note 144-147 and accompanying text.
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Felton,190 in which the Court permitted a party to attack, and ultimately have
overruled, one of the Court's own longstanding precedents through the device
of a motion for relief from a prospective judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b)(5). In order to grant such relief the Court was required
to hold that by the time the motion had been brought, the substantive
"Establishment Clause law [which had lead to the Court's original Aguilar
decision had] 'significant[ly] change[d]' since we decided Aguilar."'19
Nonetheless, the Court also indicated, confirming its Rodriguez de Quijas
doctrine, 192 that the lower courts should not have granted the Rule 60(b)(5)
motion, because they are obliged to follow even an undermined decision of the
Court such as Aguilar.'93 This leads to a very peculiar conclusion: that the
"law" in effect at the time the motion was brought was different for the
Supreme Court and for all other courts, 194 because the effect of precedent
varied in the Supreme Court as opposed to other courts. If the reasoning and
underpinnings of the precedent had been weakened, the precedent was no
longer valid in the Court itself, but it retained its validity for the rest of the
judiciary. 95 The effectiveness and constraining power of precedent, however,
is closely tied up with the nature of the "judicial power" granted by Article
111.196 Thus, for precedent to operate differently in two different courts, it must
190 521 U.S. 203, 209 (1997) (ordering relief under Rule 60(b)(5)).
191 521 U.S. at 237 (quoting Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384
(1992)).
192 See supra, Part I.
193 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 237 ("We do not acknowledge, and we do not hold, that
other courts should conclude our more recent cases have, by implication, overruled an
earlier precedent.").
194 See Baxter, supra note 22, at 438 ("Although from the point of view of the Supreme
Court, the 'current law' announced in Zobrest was in place from June 1993 on, it was in
place only for the Supreme Court's consideration.").
195 The two definitions of precedential force adopted by the Court in Agostini parallel the
modem debate over whether the effect of precedent is best understood as based on a "result"
model or a "rule" model. See Alexander, supra note 116, at 5 (describing the models for
reading precedents); Caminker, supra note 23, at 14 & n.52 (discussing the binding effect of
precedent); Schauer, supra note 114, at 579-82 (commenting on the different ways to treat
precedent). Oddly enough, however, in Agostini the Court appears to have split the baby,
adopting the narrow result-based model for itself, but imposing a rule-based model for lower
courts.
196 See Anastasoff v. U.S., 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 21179 (8th Cir. Aug. 22, 2000) at *18
("We conclude therefore that, as the Framers intended, the doctrine of precedent limits the
'judicial power' delegated to the courts in Article III."; THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 at 471
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) ("To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the
courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents.");
Dorf, supra note 34, at 2068 (1994) (discussing the limits that Article III imposes on
Congress' ability to pass statutes regulating the Court's use of precedent); but see Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the
Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L. J. 1535, 1543-44 (2000) (arguing that
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be that the judicial power differs in its nature in those courts. In particular, the
Court's analysis in Agostini reveals that when it exercises the judicial power,
the Court believes it is making rules which bind lower courts regardless of
their underlying reasoning or other traditional judicial concerns. As noted
above, this is a peculiarly legislative type of authority. 197 On the other hand,
within the Court itself its precedents are treated in a more traditional manner,
so that doctrinal coherence and consistency retain significance. And,
presumably the Court continues to believe that the lower courts should treat the
precedents established by all other federal courts in this way as well. Vis-a-vis
lower courts, then, the precedents of the Supreme Court bind like statutes.
Vis-a-vis itself, however, and among the lower courts themselves precedents
retain their traditional, malleable form.
Thus, the modem Supreme Court has bifurcated the "judicial power" of the
United States into two different powers: the traditional dispute-resolving,
precedent-making power wielded by the "inferior" federal courts; and the
power to establish abstract rules, disconnected from legal reasoning or the facts
of individual cases, wielded by the Supreme Court. For reasons I have already
touched upon, 98 this bifurcation raises serious concerns about the continued
legitimacy of the Court as a governmental institution; the modem Court's
functions have taken the Court far-perhaps too far-from the source of its
authority, which is the dispute resolution power granted in Article III.
Moreover, there seems to be no constitutional justification for the division
created by the Court. The judicial power of the United States, as described in
Article III, is unitary. There is no suggestion of two different types of power,
one for the Supreme Court and one for everyone else.199
There are thus good reasons to be concerned about the role the modem
Court has chosen for itself. I freely concede, however, that the legitimacy
stare decisis is a rule of policy only, without constitutional statute, and therefore may be
abrogated by Congress).
197 See supra notes 33-38 accompanying text; see also Wechsler, supra note 33, at 15-16
("No legislature or executive is obligated by the nature of its function to support its choice
of values by the type of reasoned explanation that I have suggested is intrinsic to judicial
action."). The Court's command to the lower courts to obey the holdings rather than the
reasoning of the Court's opinions is analogous to the Court's own approach towards
legislative history-that it is perhaps relevant to understanding the meaning of an
ambiguous statutory command, but can in no way trump or affect the validity of a statute.
'9' See supra Part I.
199 The only textual hint of such a division is the denomination of one court as "supreme"
and all others as "inferior." But for reasons I note above, supra at note 102, the
supreme/inferior terminology cannot carry that much weight. Professors Alexander and
Schauer come close to defending such a position based on the "settlement function" of law,
but their emphasis is on judicial supremacy vis a vis the other branches of government, not
on relationships within the judiciary. See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 41, at 1387 &
n.105 (suggesting that their argument is consistent with calls for lower court deference to
the constitutional views of the Supreme Court).
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argument I make here is controversial and far from decisive. Many would
argue that rulemaking is an inevitable aspect of lawmaking, including judicial
lawmaking, and indeed should be embraced rather than feared.2°° And perhaps
the relatively greater rulemaking component of the Supreme Court's decision-
making can be justified simply by its position at the apex of an increasingly
large and diverse judicial structure. 2 1 I would like, therefore, to move beyond
the broad, theoretical objections to the Court's current role, and for the rest of
this paper consider instead some more practical consequences of the modem
Court's role as an almost exclusively rulemaking institution.
B. Isolation: The Court and the Common Law Process
In its cases discussing the Article III requirement of "standing" for litigants
in federal court, the Supreme Court has set forth the various institutional
purposes served by the standing doctrine. In addition to the broad goal of
restricting the federal courts to their basic purpose of protecting "the rights of
individuals, 1202 the doctrine also ensures that courts exercise their powers and
establish rules of law in contexts in which they are best suited to do so, which
is to say, "not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete
factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of
judicial action. [In addition, because standing] assures an actual factual
setting .... a court may decide the case with some confidence that is decision
will not pave the way for lawsuits which have some, but not all, of the facts of
the case actually decided by the court. '20 3 In essence, in these cases the Court
is equating the benefits of the standing requirement with the traditionally
understood strengths of the common law process-the ability of courts to focus
on the concrete rather than the abstract in resolving individual cases, and to
treat the rules that emerge from such cases not "as final truths, but as working
hypotheses, continually retested in those great laboratories of the law," 2°4 and
modified freely over time as new facts emerge or society changes. This
contrasts with the legislative arena, where rules are formulated without the
200 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 116, at 50 (1989) (calling for "binding rules that are
'legislated' by courts in the gaps left by legislatures"); Alexander & Schauer, supra note 41,
at 1372-73; Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1455, 1456 (1995)
(suggesting that judicial opinions should play a role similar to statutes).
201 But cf. supra notes 197-198 and accompanying text (arguing against such an
understanding of Article III).
202 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992) (quoting Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803); see also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (describing how "[t]he irreplaceable value of
[Article III power] ... lies in the protection it has afforded to constitutional rights and
liberties of individual citizens").
203 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
204 BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 23 (1921) (quoting
MUNROE SMITH, JURISPRUDENCE 21 (1909)).
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benefit of such concrete examples or experience over time, and where
modification of rules is difficult, so that in evaluating the wisdom and impact
of proposed rules decision-makers must rely on the relative institutional
advantages of legislatures: their greater empirical fact-finding capacity, and
their democratic pedigree permitting the exercise of political judgment.2 5
Seen in this light, the practical problems with the Supreme Court's current
institutional role become clear. By focusing on rulemaking rather than dispute
resolution, and requiring lower courts to treat its doctrinal formulations as
inviolable rules, the equivalent of statutes, the Court has essentially given up
the comparative advantages enjoyed by the judiciary. In particular, the fact-
based focus of most judicial decision-making is largely absent in the Supreme
Court, where for most justices in most cases the facts are simply irrelevant-
the rule that emerges is the thing that matters. Moreover, because of the
limited size of its docket and the huge number of difficult legal issues
circulating in the federal courts at any time, the Court is able to visit particular
legal areas extremely infrequently, or perhaps only once. As a result, the Court
does not have the benefit of seeing an area of law evolve over time, and being
able to evaluate the impact of its rules over a range of cases. Instead, like a
legislature, the Court is forced to simply formulate a rule without any first-
hand understanding of the rule's practical consequences, and then count on the
implementers of the rule (i.e., the lower courts) to work out the problems.
All of that might be fine, except of course that the Court also lacks the
institutional advantages of legislative bodies. It completely lacks the vast
administrative apparatus that Congress and the Executive Branch bring to the
lawmaking process, and also lacks the ability to hold extended fact-finding
hearings. 20 6 Thus, it is not able to substitute ex ante empiricism for the
ongoing evaluative process that is the traditional strength of courts. Of course,
severe questions might be, and have been, raised about the fact-finding
competence of the legislative and executive branches as well.207 More
importantly, however, the Court also lacks the democratic legitimacy enjoyed
by the political branches, which is essential to be able make the forthright
205 Rulemaking by administrative agencies probably falls somewhere between the
archetypal "judicial" and "legislative" models-more flexible and grounded in the concrete
than legislatures, but more abstract, empirical and political than the judiciary.
206 For a discussion of the limits on the Court's ability to gather empirical data, see Dorf,
supra note 67, at 53-60 (discussing the Court's lack of expert staff to assist its decision-
making process). It is true that the explosion of amicus briefs filed in the Court in recent
years somewhat mitigates the Court's institutional weaknesses. However, the biased, often
sloppy submissions of lawyers writing such briefs are in no way a substitute for a careful
fact-finding process controlled by the decision-making body itself. For a discussion of the
impact of amicus briefs on Supreme Court decision-making, see Kearney and Merrill, supra
note 72.
207 See DAVID FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW
chs. 5, 6 (1999) (discussing the use of scientific data in the legislative process).
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political judgments that can often substitute for empirical knowledge. 20 8
Which is not to say, of course, that the Court does not make such judgments,
but it makes them surreptitiously and without accountability. Ultimately, this
combination of factors leaves the Court in a kind of institutional limbo, having
cast off the traditional strengths of the judiciary, but unable to replace them
with the strengths of the legislature. Instead, in recognition of its institutional
weaknesses the modem Court has taken to substituting (or hiding behind)
abstract theoretical approaches such as originalism, textualism, or political
constructs such as the "accountability" rationale offered for the Chevron
doctrine of deference to administrative interpretations of statutes.209 Such
approaches in no way correspond to the institutional strengths of the judiciary,
but they provide a shield behind which to hide the problematic nature of the
modem Court's enterprise.
To some extent, the dilemma faced by the Court is unsolvable. Absent some
institutional help-such as the much-mooted "National Court of Appeals" 210-
the Court's ability to revisit legal areas with any frequency is inherently
limited by realities. Furthermore, the needs for uniformity, coordination, and
208 Cf. Walter Dellinger and H. Jefferson Powell, Marshall's Questions, 2 GREEN BAG 2d
367, 376 (1999) (setting forth Chief Justice Marshall's views that certain kinds of
constitutional issues should be left to the political branches because their resolution requires
"the political capacity to make judgments of prudence and policy").
209 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43, 864-66 (1984) (explaining judicial review of agency rulings as a two-question
process: 1) whether Congress spoke directly to the precise question at issue; if so, the court
must apply Congress' intent; and 2) if the statute is ambiguous, is the agency's answer based
on a permissible construction of the statute); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. DOT, 137 F.3d 640,
645 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (explaining that "[iut is precisely in answering questions of this sort
that the expertise and political accountability of administrative agencies command judicial
deference."); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 628-29 (1996) (offering an
accountability justification for Chevron); Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the
Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 308-12 (1986) (discussing how Chevron shifts
policy-making responsibility from courts to "democratically accountable officials" in
agencies); cf. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 514-16 (1989) (rejecting "separation of powers" justification for
Chevron doctrine).
210 See, e.g., William H. Alsup, A Policy Assessment of the National Court of Appeals, 25
HASTINGS L.J. 1313, 1314 (1974) (discussing the proposal for the creation of a National
Court of Appeals); U.S. Comm'n on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System,
Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change (1975), reprinted in 67
F.R.D. 195, 199-204 (1975) (summarizing the recommendations for a National Court of
Appeals); James Duke Cameron, Federal Review, Finality of State Court Decisions, and a
Proposal For a National Court of Appeals-a State Judge's Solution to a Continuing
Problem, 1981 BYU L. REv. 545, 558-560 (discussing the relationship between state court
decisions and federal review, and the proposal for a National Court of Appeals).
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final resolutions of issues2 ' make it inevitable that a large part of the Court's
business will consist of resolving doctrinal conflicts and formulating rules for
other courts to follow. In other words, the Court's role today is necessarily
somewhat "legislative," and so necessarily stretches the limits of its
institutional competence. Improved fact-finding would help some, but-
Brandeis notwithstanding-there is simply no way for the Court or litigants to
duplicate the fact-finding abilities of the executive and legislative branches.
Moreover, the biggest barrier the Court faces here, its lack of democratic
accountability, is inherent in its nature, and indeed is in some contexts its
greatest strength.
So what is to be done? Perhaps nothing. No governmental institution is
perfect, and the flaws in the Court's decision-making process, while important
to identify and acknowledge, may be something we must live with, just as we
live with the flaws of the legislative and executive branches (flaws which have
been on spectacular display in recent years). However, identifying the sources
of the problems the modem Court faces does suggest some incremental steps
that might alleviate them.
Most notably, one of the gravest institutional problems the Court faces is its
splendid isolation from facts, and from the practical experience gained by
observing the legal system in action on a day to day basis. There is, however,
an obvious place for the Court to look to reduce its isolation: the lower federal
courts. Those courts, which share many of the institutional strengths of the
Court, such as life tenure and a careful (albeit not as careful) selection process,
are in the thick of the administration of justice, rather than situated in a temple
on Capitol Hill. The Court could access a great deal of knowledge simply by
paying more, and more systematic, attention to those courts' attempts to
implement the doctrines promulgated by the Supreme Court. This, of course,
would require the Court to take the theory of "percolation" seriously, not
merely as an excuse for avoiding decision, but as a source of ideas and
practical experience. Relatedly, the Court might take a more generous view of
lower courts who in light of experience experiment with, or even deviate from,
the Court's apparent preferences and doctrinal formulations. Of course, for
this kind of interaction to succeed, the lower courts must themselves be willing
to engage in independent and sometimes aggressive reasoning. Unfortunately,
as recent, self-abnegating remarks made by lower court judges suggest,212 such
willingness is often lacking. Moreover, there is now a long tradition in the
legal community, again dating back to Felix Frankfurter, of denigrating the
significance and independence of lower federal courts, and instead portraying
them as mere "intake" points for the Supreme Court.213 The docility of the
211 See generally Alexander & Schauer, supra note 41, at 1373-1381 (discussing the need
in our political and legal systems for uniformity, coordination, and finality of decisions).
212 See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
213 See Purcell, supra note 61, at 688 (noting that "[a]lthough Frankfurter's work
illuminated the history of the lower federal courts, it also constrained and warped that
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lower courts should not, however, be overstated. Over the years, the lower
courts have displayed their independence often, both in creative decision-
making and occasionally in a willingness to flout the Supreme Court.214
Moreover, there exists an enormous wealth of talent in the lower federal
courts, particularly in the Courts of Appeals; the Supreme Court's decision
making would benefit from taking advantage that talent. If a system of
independent, and aggressive lower courts could be created, it would
reintroduce some of the strengths of the common law process, including
notably the evolutionary nature of the common law, into the Court's
formulation of legal rules.
Two examples of the adventurous decision-making by the lower federal
courts that I advocate are Wittmer v. Peters,21 5 where the Seventh Circuit, in an
opinion by Judge Posner, upheld a race-conscious hiring program in a state
penal program even under the highest, "strict" standard of scrutiny mandated
by the Court for all race-conscious government actions; and Hunter v. Regents
of the University of California,216 where a divided Ninth Circuit panel upheld
under strict scrutiny a race-conscious admission program at a "laboratory"
elementary school run by U.C.L.A. The Wittmer and Hunter decisions are in
clear tension with the Supreme Court's recent hostility to affirmative action
programs, and in particular with the strong hints offered by several justices that
only remedial purposes can justify race-based government actions. 2 17
Nonetheless, neither decision explicitly defies the Court, or violates any clearly
established precedent-whether precedent is defined narrowly as only a
specific factual result, or more broadly to include the reasoning used to reach
that result.2 18 They merely reveal a willingness to explore and push the law in
new directions, where the Court, though clearly not advocating those paths, has
not yet cut them off.
2 19
The majority and dissenting opinions in Hunter present an especially
fascinating picture of the two extremes of possible lower court decision-
history").
214 See id. at 720-21 (explaining that "[r]ecent work.., has exploded the idea that the
lower federal courts are mechanical cogs in a hierarchical system, and it has broken the
automatic linkage between the rulings of the lower courts and the formal authority of the
Supreme Court").
215 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 1111 (1997).
216 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed (U.S. July 18, 2000) (No. 00-
135).
217 See supra notes 129-130 and accompanying text.
218 See Dorf, supra note 34 at 2008-09, 2029-40 (1994) (discussing the difference in the
breadth of holdings depending on the understanding and definition of "dictum").
219 For an old example of such adventurousness, see Committee for Industrial
Organization v. Hague, 25 F. Supp. 127, 146 (D.N.J. 1938), aff'd 101 F.2d 774 (3rd Cir.
1939), affid 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (holding, contrary to longstanding Supreme Court
precedent, that the First Amendment constrained state power to regulate speech in public
places).
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making styles. The majority opinion, by Judge Pregerson, acknowledges the
argument that only remedial interests can justify race-based official actions, but
rejects that position by simply pointing out that "the Supreme Court has never
held that only a state's interest in remedial action can meet strict scrutiny.
220
Judge Pregerson then proceeds to simply decide what sorts of interests can be
compelling. The dissenting opinion by Judge Beezer, on the other hand, seeks
to assess the propriety of non-remedial compelling interests by cobbling
together quotes from various dissenting, plurality, and separate opinions from
the Court, in an effort to divine the Court's will on this question.
22'
Independent judgment and reasoning is simply missing from the dissenting
opinion, and apparently is viewed by the author as inappropriate. As a result,
while the Supreme Court might learn something about the practicalities of
equal protection jurisprudence from the majority opinions in Wittmer and
Hunter, there is little it could learn from the Hunter dissent.
Of course, permitting experimentation by lower courts entails a cost in terms
of loss of centralized control by the Court, especially given the Court's limited
ability to oversee lower court decisions for error. However, in the American
political tradition centralization has never been seen as a strength for its own
sake, and certainly in the judicial context its advantages are far from apparent.
And, contrary to the Court in Hutto v. Davis, I doubt very much that granting
the lower courts a greater modicum of authority would cause "anarchy to
prevail within the federal judicial system." 222 What would be lost is some
uniformity, which as I have already discussed seems a rather modest cost.
There is also a danger of enabling "rogue" judges to flout well-established
rules; the example of Southern federal judges who abused the "all deliberate
speed" standard of Brown I/223 to delay desegregation of public schools
immediately comes to mind. Ultimately, however, the Court did decree an end
to "all deliberate speed," and Southern public schools were integrated; 224 and
the delay that did occur is perhaps attributable as much to excess caution on
the part of the Court (not to mention the political branches) as to the inherent
effectiveness of the lower federal judiciary's revolt against Brown.
Furthermore, the saga of Brown and desegregation must be understood as the
exceptional rather than the usual case. In almost all instances, it is reasonable
220 Hunter, 190 F.3d at 1064 n.6.
221 See id. at 1070-76 (Beezer, J. dissenting).
222 Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374-75 (1982) (per curiam).
2213 Brown v. Board of Ed. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
224 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (authorizing
forced busing to eliminate all vestiges of race-based segregation from public schools);
Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (banning a "freedom-
of-choice" plan that was perpetuating segregation); Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince
Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (striking down racially motivated public school
closings); Goss v. Board of Educ. of Knoxville, 373 U.S. 683 (1963) (refusing to uphold a
race-based transfer program because it would perpetuate segregation).
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to expect that the appeals process and the multi-judge nature of appellate
panels, as well as the possibilities of en banc and eventually Supreme Court
review, are likely to provide effective checks against rogue behavior.
More significantly, greater lower court freedom would weaken the
"settlement function" of Supreme Court decisions, recently extolled by
Professors Alexander and Schauer.225 More power to experiment with, and
deviate from, the Court's decisions would result in less settlement of legal
issues.226 The common law process does not, however, permit great leaps or
repudiations of precedent, and certainly even a more generous approach to
lower court independence would not permit lower courts to simply abandon the
major principles established by the Court's decisions. Just as a "common law
judge could not say, I think the doctrine of consideration a bit of historical
nonsense and shall not enforce it in my court," 227 so a lower court could not
refuse to follow the fundamental holdings of Roe v. Wade, Hans v. Louisiana,
or the Court's Establishment Clause decisions.228 The values advanced by
judicial creativity and independence must be balanced against the costs
imposed by legal uncertainty and instability, and the common law system
through its strong system of stare decisis draws this balance heavily in favor of
stability. The costs of permitting greater lower court experimentation thus
should not be overstated. But some costs are inevitable.
C. Checks and Balances: Limiting the Judicial Power
There is another, more subtle benefit to the Court adopting a more
collaborative strategy vis a vis the lower federal courts-a benefit which would
accrue not to the Court itself, but to the polity more generally. This is because
in addition to assisting the Supreme Court in its lawmaking function, a more
225 Alexander & Schauer, supra note 41, at 1371 (explaining that the Supreme Court
performs an important coordination function by settling what the law dictates).
226 An example of an adventurous lower court decision unsettling well-established
precedent is the Fourth Circuit's recent decisions in United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d
667, 692 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000), where the court held, departing from
30 years of caselaw at all levels of the federal judiciary as well as the expressed wishes of
the Department of Justice, that a federal statutes, 18 U.S.C. §3501, overruled the Court's
decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). However, the Supreme Court
overruled the Fourth Circuit, demonstrating that the Court remains quite capable of
responding to major deviations from settled law.
227 BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESs 69 (1921) (quoting
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
228 Cf Jaffree v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs of Mobile County, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1128
(S.D. Ala. 1983), affd in part and rev'd sub nom. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied 446 U.S. 926 (1984), aff'd 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (asserting, contrary to
well-established Supreme Court precedent, that "[b]ecause the establishment clause of the
first amendment to the United States Constitution does not prohibit the state from
establishing a religion, the prayers offered by the teachers in this case are not
unconstitutional").
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independent and assertive lower federal judiciary might also play another role:
to check the power of the Court in its exercise of that function.
There is a substantial need under modem conditions for some sort of
checking mechanism against the power of the Court. The Supreme Court is at
the head of one of the three co-equal branches of the federal government. As
such, the Court exercises one of the three powers of government, the judicial
power, and in the twentieth century that power has become one of enormous
practical importance-far more so than the framers of the Constitution could
ever have envisioned. The Court is also able to wield that power with great
effectiveness. Though it is a multimember body, the Court is nowhere near as
unwieldy as Congress, with its 535 members; and this smaller size permits the
Court a capacity for forthrightness that is missing in the legislative branch.
The judicial power is thus more akin, under modem circumstances, to the
executive power, both because it is exercised by a small group that is able to
act with decisiveness when needed, and because it is wielded through
commands issued to others-though the courts, unlike the President, are
entirely dependent on others' willingness to obey to be effective. 229 As a
consequence, the Court shares many of the institutional features which have
permitted the Executive Branch to so enhance its power during the 20th
century.
What is distinctive about the Court is the complete absence of any effective
inter-branch checks and balances against its authority in the constitutional
system as it is currently implemented.230 The other branches are checked in
obvious ways. The President is constantly subject to congressional oversight,
spending restrictions, legislative interference, and ultimately the ballot.
Congress is subject to even greater electoral oversight, and it is also subject to
a presidential veto and to the President's unwillingness to enforce the laws it
passes. And, of course, both branches are subject to judicial review by the
Court, which in recent years has turned out to be of substantial practical
importance.
231
However, there are no such effective checks against the Court. The only
direct influence the President has over the Court is in his appointment function,
but the effect of that influence wanes quickly, as intended, because of the
229 In this respect the judicial power is in principle quite different from the Executive
power, which the President exercises alone; but in practice it may not be very different since
the President cannot act without substantial assistance from subordinates.
230 The lack of checks on the Court with respect to constitutional law is in contrast to the
Court's role in statutory interpretation, where it is subject to the obvious check of
congressional action reversing judicial interpretation. The concerns raised in this section
are, therefore, primarily of concern when the Court is interpreting the Constitution.
231 See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (striking down the Line
Item Veto Act); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking down Brady gun
control legislation); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act); Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S.
844 (1997) (striking down the Communications Decency Act).
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Constitution's assurance of life tenure. Congress does, in principle, have more
direct ways of checking the Court-notably, its powers under the "exceptions
and regulations" clause of Article III to control the Court's appellate
jurisdiction, 232 as well as the more blunt power to control the size and
organization of the Court.233 While historically these powers have sometimes
been exercised-notably in Congress's cancellation of the 1802 Term of the
Court for political reasons234 and its changes to the size of the Court in 1860s to
ensure a pro-Civil War and pro-Reconstruction majority235-the power has
been essentially defunct for political reasons since the defeat of President
Roosevelt's "Court packing" plan in 1937.236 Congress also, of course, has the
power of impeachment over Supreme Court justices, but again, it is
inconceivable in the modem political climate that the power would or could be
employed simply because of disagreement over how the Court is exercising its
authority, as opposed to gross moral turpitude. In fact, no Supreme Court
justice has ever been removed from office through impeachment (indeed, no
justice has been impeached since Samuel Chase in 1804).237
Finally, the most obvious limitation on the Court's power is of course the
physical impotence of the judicial branch. The Court depends on the other
branches to enforce its judgments, leaving them with the ultimate potential
check on the Court: inaction. The other branches employed this check after the
Court's decision in Worcester v. Georgia,238 and arguably employed it again
during the first decade after the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education.239 In practice, however, for political reasons the willingness of the
232 See U.S. CONST, art. III, § 2, cl. 2. In Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1869) the
Court suggested that that power is largely unlimited, but the extent of Congress's power
remains hotly debated. For an excellent summary of that debate, see Dodge, supra note 100
at 1015-17 (outlining the "essential functions" and "distributive" theories of Congress'
exceptions power).
233 See U.S. CONST., art. III. Article III does not define the size or composition of the
Court, or the details of when it shall meet, etc. As a consequence, such matters are set by
statute, giving Congress the potential power to manipulate the composition or schedule of
the Court for its own ends.
234 See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 32 (3d ed. 1996).
235 See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 478
(Kermit Hall, ed. 1992) (describing the changes in the number of Supreme Court justices).
236 See generally BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT 11-25 (1998);
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-Packing"
Plan, 1966 SuP. CT. REV. 347.
237 See OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 235, at 423-24.
238 31 U.S. 515 (1832); see LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 725 (3d
ed. 2000) (discussing President Andrew Jackson's failure to enforce the Court's decision in
favor of the Cherokee Tribe).
239 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil
Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 9 (1994) (citing figures demonstrating negligible
desegregation in first decade after Brown); id. at 130-140 (demonstrating the lack of support
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other branches to flout judicial orders has diminished substantially, to the point
of nonexistence. This is in part because of the tremendous prestige enjoyed by
the Supreme Court, and in part because of the rather low esteem into which the
elected branches have fallen. The consequence is that to fight the Court would
entail tremendous political costs, costs that neither the Congress nor the
President are willing to accept today. As a result the modem Court's frontal
assault on affirmative action,240 its new-found limitations on congressional
regulatory authority,241 and its inroads into congressional authority over the
states based on quite dubious readings of the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments, 242 have been accepted by the other branches without much
resistance, or even vocal complaint. More fundamentally, the modem Court
has claimed for itself the right to define the nature and scope of its own
constitutional authority, 243 a power that it denies the other branches of
government,244 and yet the other branches have acquiesced to the Court's claim
in recent years (in contrast to the views of Presidents Jefferson, Jackson,
Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt). 245 Of course, in politics all things come to
an end, and the current immunity of the Court from political interference may
well pass. For now, however, there is little that the other branches seem
for civil rights during Eisenhower and early Kennedy administrations).
240 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (requiring
that federal racial classifications pass the strict scrutiny test).
241 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 120 S.Ct. 1740 (2000) (striking down the
Violence Against Women Act as exceeding Congress' powers under both the Interstate
Commerce Clause and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (holding that §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not give Congress
the power to define substantive violations of that amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990 as exceeding
Congress' powers under the Interstate Commerce Clause).
242 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Congress cannot subject
abrogate State sovereign immunity by authorizing lawsuits in State courts); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (holding that Congress lacks the power to require local
law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on potential gun buyers); Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 53 (1996) (deciding that Congress cannot abrogate
State sovereign immunity using its Article I powers).
243 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (reciting that the "basic principle that the
federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution" to support the
proposition that the Supreme Court's "interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment... is
the supreme law of the land").
244 See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 522 (1969) (holding that the Congress
cannot impose criteria for membership in excess of what is provided in the Constitution);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-88 (1952) (deciding that the
Constitution does not give the President the power to issue an executive order to seize steel
mills).
245 But see Edwin Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TULANE L. REV. 979, 985
(1987) ("[C]onstitutional interpretation is not the business of the Court only, but also
properly the business of all branches of government.").
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willing to do to limit the Court's assertions and exercise of power.
What does this have to do with the lower federal courts? If Congress and
the President, with their vastly greater power and influence, cannot effectively
check the Supreme Court, how can a district court judge in Iowa? Perhaps she
cannot, or at least not much. But, the judges of the lower federal courts do
enjoy one great advantage over Congress and the President-they are not
elected. As a result, they are insulated from popular reaction, and indeed share
some of the luster enjoyed by the Supreme Court because of their nonpolitical
status. As to how the lower courts can check the Court, it is probably not
thorough full-scale civil disobedience. Ultimately, the lower courts largely are,
and will remain, the "messengers" and implementers of the Court's will.
246
However, a greater independence on the part of "inferior" federal judges, a
greater willingness to think for themselves, to deviate from doctrine which
does not make sense, and to try and impose doctrinal coherence on the Court's
work, would in practice limit the Court's power to some extent. At a
minimum, it would force the Court to focus more on reasons and on traditional
legal analysis than on the raw exercise of power in reaching decisions and
formulating doctrine. It might even lead the Court to take notice of the effects
of, and difficulties in, implementing its decisions.
Of course, none of these checks resemble the blunt limits on power available
against the political branches. It should be noted in this regard that the changes
that I propose here do not require any tangible modifications to existing
procedures and doctrines (other than, perhaps, overruling the doctrine of
Rodriguez de Quijas and Agostini).2 47 They instead require some evolution in
the institutional culture and attitudes of the federal judiciary, a far more subtle
and difficult thing. At bottom, I suggest that the Court would do a better job,
and would better serve its constitutional role, if it treated the lower federal
courts as collaborators, rather than as employees. Of course, all collaborators
are not created equal, and nothing I propose would deny the Court the power to
have the final word on cases or issues; but it would change the extent to which
the Court tries to micromanage the activities of the lower courts. Realistically,
therefore, the possibility of such change is probably slight because the Court is
composed of human beings, and human beings are notoriously unwilling to
yield power for the sake of abstract benefits. It may also be in vain to hope for
such limited resistance from the lower courts. Such a reaction against the
leaders of their own branch of government would be difficult, especially
because as noted the Supreme Court seems unlikely to cooperate in a project
which would curtail its own power. Any assertion of independence on the part
of the lower judiciary will necessarily be in the face of opposition, active
resistance, and criticism by the Supreme Court, a force which in truth most
federal judges are likely to find irresistible. And in fact, lower courts show
only a limited willingness to express their dissatisfaction, or to try and nudge
246 See supra, Part II.
247 See supra, Part I.
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the Court towards a more collaborative approach.
External pressure thus seems essential if reform is to proceed, but there is no
obvious source for such pressure. Congress might possess the power to alter
the relationships within the federal judiciary, including the nature and force of
stare decisis (and thus overrule, at a minimum, the rule of Rodriguez de
Quijas);248 but it seems unlikely that Congress, or the President, would wish to
get involved. And in truth, they probably should not, given this country's long
and healthy tradition of judicial independence.
Moreover, even if the Court is willing to contemplate a loss of power, such
changes in the Court's culture and practices will take some time to become
useful, because of the effects that the modem Court's approach of stripping
independence and authority has had on the culture of the lower federal courts.
Many if not most lower court judges no longer think of themselves as
participants in the joint process of formulating legal rules, and the consequent
loss of intellectual independence and curiosity makes those courts ill-suited to
(and apparently uninterested in) the collaborative process which I espouse.
None of this, however, is irreversible, and such resistance, if it were to emerge,
would provide at least some check on the Court's power. That can only be an
improvement on the current situation: a Court which faces essentially no
external restraints on its power, and has largely abandoned any internal ones
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, because of its institutional structure, has increasingly
come to resemble the courts of Louis XVI or Czar Nicolas II-isolated and out
of touch from the "inferior" federal courts that it supervises. The Court's
isolation manifests itself in a number of ways. For example, the Court has
come to adopt an increasingly autocratic view of the force and immutability of
its own precedents, a trend which displays itself in the doctrine of Rodriguez
de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. 24 9 that lower courts must follow
even doctrinally undermined Supreme Court decisions. In addition, the
justices of the Supreme Court have largely come to disdain relying on or
seeking guidance from the lower courts in the course of the Court's work.
Most fundamentally, however, the Supreme Court has drifted away from the
institutional role of the judiciary, a role still played by the lower courts: the
resolution of disputes. Instead, the Court has increasingly evolved into a
maker of rules, a quasi-legislature for the judiciary. As with legislative edicts,
the Court's rules are made largely without consideration of the factual contexts
in which they will be applied, and without awareness of the complexities of
248 See generally Paulsen, supra note 196, at 1582 (defending congressional power to
alter stare decisis); Dorf, supra note 34, at 2068 (suggesting limits on Congress' power); but
cf. Anastanoff v. U.S., 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 21179 (8th Cir. Aug. 22, 2000) (tying the
doctrine of precedent to the "judicial power" of Article III, and thus raising question about
Congress' power to alter the effect of precedent).
249 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
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actual implementation. As a result, the Court's "rules," its doctrines, are often
announced in a vacuum, without explanation or opportunity to evolve over
time-in other words, without the traditional fortes of the common law
decision-making process. None of this is to question the undoubted strengths
of the Court, or the competence and good intentions of its members. The
problem is institutional.
One might expect some resentment to emerge from within the rest of the
judiciary in response to the increasingly imperialistic Court. And indeed, there
is evidence of just such a reaction, especially among the more prominent
members of the lower federal judiciary. It is possible that this reaction might
rise someday to the level of resistance to, if not defiance of, the Court's
hegemony, and the development of an increasingly assertive lawmaking stance
by the lower courts. After all, revolutions come from below. One of the
primary theses of this paper is that such a development would probably be
extremely beneficial to the federal judiciary as an institution, and even to the
Supreme Court itself. Candidly, however, a sua sponte change in the
institutional culture of the lower judiciary is unlikely and probably unrealistic.
That culture has largely become a culture of obedience. For every hint of
grumbling at the Supreme Court, there are a myriad of voices in the lower
courts vowing obeisance. Moreover, the makeup and nature of the federal
judiciary, the very bastion of privilege and order, makes it an unlikely source
for insurrection.
All of which leads to the conclusion that there is probably little to be done
about the current situation. It is perhaps unfortunate but hardly surprising that
as the power and importance of the Court has grown in recent decades, the
institutional nature of the Court has evolved. Presumably, in time an
institutional self-correction will occur. Nonetheless, there is always value in
knowledge, in developing some understanding of the Court's unique position
within the judicial system, and the strengths and weaknesses that are associated
with it. Moreover, beyond such purely scholarly value, perhaps a wider
awareness of the Court's peculiar institutional role might produce pressures for
change, from within or without.
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